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 This dissertation explores how contemporary, small-press, speculative fiction deviates 
from other genres in depicting the processes of consciousness in narrative. I study how the 
confluence of contemporary cognitive theory and experimental, small-press, speculative fiction 
has produced a new narrative mode, one wherein literature portrays not the product of 
consciousness but its process instead. Unlike authors who worked previously in the stream-of-
consciousness or interior monologue modes, writers in this new narrative mode (which this 
dissertation refers to as "the little weird") use the techniques of recursion, narratological 
anachrony, and Ulric Neisser’s "ecological self" to avoid the constraints of textual linearity that 
have historically prevented other literary modes from accurately portraying the operations of 
"self." Extrapolating from Mieke Bal's seminal theory of narratology; Tzvetan Todorov's theory 
of the fantastic; Daniel C. Dennett's theories of consciousness; and the works of Darko Suvin, 
Robert Scholes, Jean Baudrillard, and others, I create a new mode not for classifying categories 
of speculative fiction, but for re-envisioning those already in use. This study, which concentrates 
on the work of progressive, small-press, speculative writers such as Kelly Link, Forrest Aguirre, 
George Saunders, Jeffrey Ford, China Miéville, and many others, explores new ideas about 
narrative "coherence" from the points of view of self as they are presented today by cognitive, 
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INTRODUCTION: THE LITTLE WEIRD 
[I]t is only with the new century that what one might call genre-morphing has become a 
central defining enterprise within fantastic literature. 
John Clute 
 
Writers of New Weird, Interstitial, New Wave Fabulist, or Slipstream literature assert 
that today’s progressive speculative fiction borrows elements from many genres.1 However, 
many, if not most, writers of speculative fiction still work within genre boundaries (i.e. space 
opera, cyberpunk, high fantasy, hard science fiction, etc.), and they write progressively within 
those parameters. Increasingly though, the poetics promulgated in the small-press magazines that 
embrace experimentation are finding their way to broader audiences. Niche markets sustain 
themselves within a textual community of progressive and experimental speculation, and today 
this community’s literature is beginning to appeal to larger markets. This literature, to begin with 
generalizations, is not as broadly attractive or approachable as the more clearly defined, more 
tried-and-true works that typify speculative fiction. Many of the progressive forms under 
discussion—with their often sustained and driving interests in characterization over plot—are 
either outright “literary” or close enough to invoke the term, a distinction that contributes to their 
general separation from more “mainstream” speculative fiction. Other subversive, non-
mainstream forms such as magical realism, surrealism, the fantastic, the marvelous, and the 
uncanny are all ready modes within the world of progressive, small-press speculative fiction; 
however, any of these forms are subject to deconstruction, re-alignment, even contradiction. 
Nevertheless, a familiarity with them makes a critical shift into the progressive mode an easy 
transition. 
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 The literature of the progressively experimental community I am addressing coexists in 
the pages of the small press with examples of “cleaner,” non-hybridized works in the forms I 
mentioned above (and many more) and with more mainstream speculation. These other works 
have received critical attention in the past under the rubrics of the larger classifications they 
belong to (i.e. fantasy, science fiction, horror); however, the poetics that appear within the cross 
sample of the truly experimental and truly progressive have not undergone as much 
consideration. For this reason, and for the venues wherein this literature appears, I refer to this 
mode as the “little weird.” This dissertation examines the new poetic directions that 
contemporary, experimental, and progressive small-press speculative fiction takes to distance 
itself from the more traditional, non-hybridized forms whence it takes its formative examples. 
Contemporary theories of consciousness, studies in narratology and semiotics, linguistic 
analysis, and postmodern literary criticism all offer lenses through which we may view the 
convolutions of the little weird.  
 The general, distinguishing poetics of the little weird are inverted. I mean this 
discursively: these elements are inverted relative to their uses in older forms such as magic 
realism and the fantastic. In Todorov’s early definitions of the fantastic, critical interest centers 
on the fantastic hesitation, the pause during which a focal character (or reader) cannot determine 
if the events he or she is facing are “marvelous” (and therefore supernatural) or “uncanny” (and 
therefore natural, albeit unique). The fantastic lasts as long as the hesitation; once the character 
makes his or decision, the text enters one or the other mode.2 All three of these modes, however, 
emphasize the events: grounded in the mundane, characters encounter these strange occurrences 
and must then reconcile the experience with what they knew about the world and themselves 
before. However, in the little weird, the reverse is true: when fantastic, marvelous, or uncanny 
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events occur, focal primacy is placed not upon these events but upon the characters or focalizors 
and their (often) broken relationships with themselves and others.3 The invasion of the weird into 
the narrative framework is a given: it is offered as speculative staple out of which these stories 
are built. What is far more unapproachable is the self, destabilized as it has become by cognitive 
science and social upheaval. The worlds of technological and social innovation have largely 
caught up to speculative fiction, leaving its characters in the same quandaries of self suffered by 
its readers. John Clute, addressing this problem in The Cambridge Companion to Science Fiction 
asks “Can sf, as a set of cognitions which differ from the world, exist in a world which takes on 
the colouring of our thought? What now is figure, what now is ground? What now is difference, 
what now is mission statement?”4 The little weird answers by dodging the question: the sublime 
is not in accepting a lack of understanding with some unknowable and indefinable event or thing; 
the sublime comes in accepting the impossibility of understanding a self that, in relation to the 
world that has caught up to its speculation, as Clute points out, is in a constant state of flux. 
Under these circumstances, “strange” events are metaphors for the socio-cognitive uncertainty of 
being. 
 The little weird also inverts the typical power-relations found in magical realism. 
Traditionally, magical realism has concerned itself with juxtaposing the magical (typified as non-
Western, post-colonial, and anti-positivistic) against the real (Western, rational, and 
epistemologically intolerant).5 This mode has opened narrative opportunities for cultural voices 
that have previously, under the oppression of what Maggie Ann Bowers calls “totalitarian 
regimes,” struggled to be heard.6 In this literature, the magic is presented just as matter-of-factly 
as the real, therefore theorizing either a new order entirely that breaks the logic separating the 
magic from the real or simply theorizing that the magic (whatever it represents) exists even in the 
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face of the oppressive real. The characters who typically appear as agents in magical realist texts 
are often disenfranchised and removed from the oppression’s centers of power. In the little 
weird, juxtaposing the magic and the real is not simply a way of demonstrating how the “magic” 
(and who it represents) can negotiate with the “real”; it is also a model for demonstrating how 
the oppressive, rational “real” can approach and apprehend the “magic.” The characters in works 
of little weird fiction need not be disenfranchised, under-represented, or oppressed: indeed, they 
can be painfully mired in the “totalitarian regime” as generic citizens with generic jobs. 
However, these “real” characters can still find, in the struggle to apprehend the “self,” that the 
magic (or weird) defines their problems far more clearly than the rational real, for as I will argue, 
the nature of “self” is weird. Furthermore, if the dual narrative modes of magical realism both 
characterize the respective people each embodies, then both the magic and the real are 
representationally recursive narratives. The people are the manner of their stories—for example, 
a story presenting the “magic” as it is conceived within the cultural ideology of colonized people 
represents how they conceive of existence not only narratively but in the “real” world as well. Ill 
defining as this is, it demonstrates that there has been a narrative anxiety about the importance of 
understanding the self before understanding the landscape and whatever events occur there 
beyond the scope of a people’s worldview (and therefore “magic”). The little weird simply 
brings this anxiety into narrative primacy, often unconcerned about what has been culturally 
suppressed in favor of examining the uncertain cultural roles characters are thrust into, even if 
their culture is the “totalitarian regime.” 
 Furthermore, stories in the little weird typically occur in the “real” world and not in 
alternative worlds as pure science fiction and fantasy sometimes do. However, the mimetic 
nature of the little weird ends there. Time and reality can flow in any direction in this literature; 
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insofar as these stories are coherent within their own narrative frameworks, they exhibit no 
concern for anchoring their models to a knowable world—that is to say, the “weird” elements in 
stories do not have to “mean” anything. Frame stories can become main stories (as in Kelly 
Link’s “Lull” and Jeffrey Ford’s “The Yellow Chamber”).7 Landmasses and locomotion may re-
invent themselves as necessary for the story (as in Ed Park’s “Well-Moistened with Cheap Wine, 
the Sailor and the Wayfarer Sing of Their Absent Sweethearts” and Christopher Rowe’s “The 
Force Acting on the Displaced Body”).8 Dreams or alternate states of consciousness can make 
the real world before they have even occurred (again “The Yellow Chamber,” also Alex Irvine’s 
“Gus Dreams of Biting the Mailman” and Jonathan Lethem’s “The Dystopianist, Thinking of His 
Rival, Is Interrupted by a Knock on the Door”).9 All of these instabilities and textual 
experimentations point to a larger, overarching concern in the little weird: there are no worlds, 
no realities; there are only people and their self-world metaphors. This, of course, can be clearer 
in some works than in others, particularly in those that deal very directly with the anxiety of self 
as far more destabilizing than invasions of the strange (as in Elizabeth Hand’s “The Least 
Trumps,” Glen Hirshberg’s “Shipwreck Beach,” or Peter Straub’s “Little Red’s Tango”).10 In 
these last examples, there is certainly more of the “real world” than in, for example, “Lull” or 
“The Yellow Chamber”; however, the first three demonstrate the same anxiety, for, as Mieke Bal 
argues in Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, events must be “motivated” for 
inclusion in a narrative by who- or whatever is focalizing the elements of the story.11 These 
focalizors are then “making” their worlds in accordance with what their personal anxieties 
dictate warrants inclusion in the narration of their experiences. 
It bears mentioning that my discussion and categorizing of the little weird is not a 
manifesto. I am not proposing a call for literature that will voice the concerns of genre-blurring 
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and form-destabilizing poetics. Rather, I am attempting to map the confluence of the varied 
characteristics of progressive speculation occurring today. I am attempting a survey of a 
particular textual community; I am not trying to create one. Indeed, it is the preexistence of this 
textual community (loose and largely undefined as it is) that makes my study significant for this 
stage of the speculative tradition. There are a number of reasons why this community developed; 
however, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish which of its characteristics are symptomatic and 
which were generative. As comfortable as writers and editors of little weird fiction are with 
recursion, however, it seems only appropriate that the “real” world out of which they work 
should be as unstable and relative as the work itself. After all, verdicts such as “symptomatic” 
and “generative” are simply the conclusions produced by different perspectives. Others have 
asked whether art mirrors life or life mirrors art. My study is largely uninterested in answering 
this question. 
 The little weird and its textual community are also tied to the Information Age. As global 
economic factors exert their influence upon the operation of publishing houses, magazine 
presses, and even the disposable income of citizens in general, the downsizing and 
conglomeration of media producers shifts to keep pace. As certain smaller publishers, production 
companies, and other media outlets cease operation, others emerge to claim their territory. The 
larger firms, however, that produce the majority of today’s creative commodities find themselves 
forced to hedge their bets in regard to what chances they can take with literature, film, or games. 
It is no secret (nor is it a conspiracy) that most of what these firms offer can be categorized as 
“safe”—it is based on models that have turned profits before, models that typify what is 
“mainstream.” This safety, of course, is circular: commodified literature will present, more or 
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less, ideas, themes, and epistemologies that are sympathetic with those being presented by film 
and games.  
 The small press, however, counterbalances this by publicly experimenting with “safety” 
in literature. Brian Attebery argues that most innovation in the speculative fiction field today 
occurs in periodicals.12 I extend his argument: the most innovative segment of this innovation 
occurs within small-press periodicals, for even well-funded and well-established periodicals have 
expenses to cover and profits to turn. To a large degree, the magazines, collections, anthologies, 
and even novels produced by the small press turn no profit—sometimes they are lucky to simply 
break even. As a result, the editors publishing this material, I conclude, are doing so for reasons 
other than straight monetary gain, and they are willing to take greater risks with their material. 
Perhaps they are trying to establish themselves as the voices of progress. Perhaps they are 
performing studies of their own, wrestling with the ideas of textual communities and narrative 
forms in the most direct way possible: circulation. Perhaps they publish simply because they love 
particular strains of literature; literature in general; or, simply, all things textual. There may be no 
good reason why some of them do what they do, but it is enough for the purpose at hand that 
they do it.  
 But there remains the little weird’s ties to the Information Age. One of the most feasible 
methods for small-presses to operate is electronically. They offer their literature, articles, and 
interviews as digital magazines, often linking to each other and back to themselves in dizzying 
convolutions that can lead their readers through a labyrinthine publishing underworld. There are 
very few rules (or even expectations) for how these e-zines should operate, and since some offer 
the same pay rates to their contributors as larger, established presses, these smaller enterprises 
offer work by the same writers powering what I earlier described as “mainstream.” This is, of 
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course, not universally true, and many, many magazines offer little to no pay. Just so, the 
material the small presses offer so readily makes of the entire small-press and e-movement one 
large, operating deconstruction of more mainstream speculative fiction. That the editors and 
writers involved in the “mainstream” are sometimes similarly involved in the underground only 
heightens the idea promulgated by progressive speculative fiction that the self is shapable, not 
only artistically, but methodologically as well.  
 Furthermore, the recent popularity of low-budget micro films and games available 
through the internet influences the little weird community. Entire artistic genres can appear, 
present their operating aesthetics, and then disappear at alarming rates, sometimes within a 
matter of days. Every aesthetic (not simply those beloved of speculative fiction) has, or soon 
will, come under experimentation through the internet. Feedback comes instantaneously, and 
these experiments remake themselves at dizzying rates. The very idea of artistic form itself has 
come under attack, and postmodern metafiction has become a staple for this ever-changing 
artistic dynamo. There are few remaining lines between art and self, and those that still exist are 
in danger of disappearing. 
 The writers, artists, programmers, and designers (among the myriad of others) who 
maintain online journals (web logs: blogs) are as recursive and interconnected as the 
aforementioned e-zines. Whereas during the Golden Age of speculative fiction, critical 
discussion had to occur largely in the form of letters written in to editors, these same discussions 
now take place across the network of blogs: the blogosphere.13 The Information Age has 
facilitated instantaneous discussion between thinkers who, in previous decades, would only have 
been able to engage each other as easily by coming together face-to-face. To return to the textual 
community of the little weird, writers, artists, and editors have taken critical theory from the 
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sequestered discussions of Academe and re-invented it as they see fit. Discussions of form, 
narrative, identity, and poetics occur alongside personal anecdotes, confessions, political 
argumentation, and even the perpetuation of “memes”—the form of Richard Dawkins’s 
discovery as it has come to be known in its electronic incarnation.14 There is no longer a clean 
line between high art and low, between a theoretical discussion and simple amusement. Derrida 
and Saussure must now share digital page-space with the faces on American Idol and Survivor, 
and textual communities like the little weird express how this fast-paced and ever-changing 
environment destabilizes ideas of the self, the real, the virtual, and the simulacrum. As I said 
before, there are no longer selves and landscapes, there are simply selves expressing—voices 
espousing and abandoning artistic methodology as rapidly as possible to keep not only their 
listeners, but also themselves, guessing. In an age of widespread political dissatisfaction, 
economic uncertainty, and artistic exhaustion, it has become less important to hold fast to clear, 
mimetic aesthetics and more important to demonstrate that change cannot occur and then settle 
down to a good, several-decades run as a solidified form. As writers, artists, and editors seek 
answers for why things are how they are and who can be blamed for what, their creative output 
suggests that no one gets the responsibility. No one, in this sense, owes anyone anything, though 
as the world-bending literature of the little weird demonstrates, we still have not, as a world-
community, admitted to ourselves that we have realized this. 
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THINKING METAPHORS:   
NEW IDEAS IN CONSCIOUSNESS AND FOCALIZATION 
[I]f something like this could happen, and granted it’s speculative and not particularly 
likely for any given person, still you have to acknowledge that probabilities aren’t 
predictive, then anything you read could really be true. True like the-sky-is-blue true or 
two-plus-two-is-four-true. And the other thing is that you . . . could be a fiction, which . . 





Mapping the processes of consciousness that appear in the little weird must begin with a 
new definition of what it is “to be” cognitively. Many contemporary theories of consciousness 
portray the “self” that each of us knows so well as an operational metaphor, a collision of ideas, 
impulses, and reflexes that, when taken as a whole, presents the illusion of a controlling unit in 
the brain. Descartes’s classic ideas about the division between mind and body bequeathed to 
modern conceptions of self the prevailing fiction of the ghost in the machine of the human brain. 
Modern science and contemporary philosophy, however, both struggle to undo the Cartesian 
legacy.1 These disciplines recast consciousness as a second-order fiction produced by the first-
order myth of objective perception.2  Many literary theories, however, fail to incorporate these 
scientific deconstructions into their studies of literary selves—or, importantly, what produces 
them—but as David Lodge points out in Consciousness and the Novel, “Literature constitutes a 
kind of knowledge about consciousness which is complementary to scientific knowledge.”3 By 
exploring how contemporary theories of self do away with a number of previously held ideas 
about personal agency, governance of the body, and perceptual objectivity, we reveal the memes 
and other cognitive motivations actually at work within a text—or, for that matter, within any 
work of art. Our expressions of self are the “voices” of our awareness, of the varying crises that 
 
13 
result from everyday existence in a reality built on myths. 
Positing a thorough model of consciousness is not a brief exercise. An understanding of 
self is arguably a thinker’s most primary understanding, so asking him or her to embrace a new 
one is both conceptually and methodologically difficult.4 After all, even thinkers willing to 
examine a new theory of consciousness must think through their already-established senses of 
self. It would seem that asking a reader to consider a new concept of consciousness is simply 
undoable. Doing so wants a meta-consciousness through which to study first-consciousness; 
however, since such meta-consciousness is still beyond our reach, we are left with forming a new 
theory from the old. 
In contrast to the thoroughness required to disprove the un-do-ableness of such an 
undertaking, what I present here is simply a sketch, a collation of the most salient aspects of 
contemporary theories of consciousness. For that matter, it would be beyond the scope of this 
study to paraphrase every theory of self that coheres with the little weird. As such, I situate here 
only the most fundamental for a new poetics of self. 
“Focalization” and “motivation” are essential components of the examination. Although 
there have been many adaptations to and extrapolations of narratologist Mieke Bal’s definitions, 
her theories still hold largely true in narratological discussion. As such, I will not re-invent the 
wheel. Focalization, under Bal’s definition, “is . . . the relation between the vision and that which 
is ‘seen,’ perceived.”5 Narrators must perceive before they can narrate. “Focalization” 
systematizes this perception by pointing, in turn, to “motivation”: 
Motivation is, then, a function of focalization. A character sees an object. The description 
is the reproduction of what it sees. Looking at something requires time, and, in this 
fashion, the description is incorporated into the time lapse. But an act of looking must 
also have its motivation. There must be enough light so that the character is able to 
observe the object. There is a window, an open door, an angle of vision which also have 
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to be described and therefore motivated. Further, the character must have both the time to 
look and the reason to look at an object.6   
 
In other words, literary events are motivated for focalization, a process that can reveal a 
narrator’s relation to both its textual world and to the real one that informs it. Uncovering the 
significance of what does and what does not appear in a narrative environment like this tracks the 
environment’s relation to a focalizor’s experiential situation—to its self. This question of 
relation, I posit, clarifies how memetic impulse directs consciousness—in this case, its creations: 
characters, narrators, and focalizors. Instabilities of narrative reality, in this regard, become not 
necessarily problems with reality; rather, they become problems with focalization. As Robert 
Scholes theorizes,  
Fiction has always been characterized by its ability to perform two functions. Some 
fictions accomplish both equally, some emphasize one. . . . We may call these two 
functions sublimation and cognition. As sublimation, fiction is a way of turning our 
concerns into satisfying shape, a way of relieving anxiety, of making life bearable. . . . As 
sublimation, fiction takes our worst fears and tames them by organizing them in a form 
charged with meaning and value. . . . In its cognitive function, fiction helps us to know 
ourselves and our existential situation.7   
 
I argue that all narratives “accomplish both”; however, the “shapes” of characters’ concerns are 
not “satisfying,” and the terms of their “organization” should be examined at the level of 
consciousness, not of narrative. Characters internalize the weird when it occurs around them—as 
they internalize all things. Characters can no more isolate the weird’s relevance to the real than 
the critics who study them. 
In addition to my limitations on how many cognitive theories I include here, the cross-
section of little weird fiction I address is also unavoidably narrow. The number of small-press 
venues (both print and electronic) publishing progressive speculation seems to rise every day. As 
a result, I cannot, in this study, represent them all—for that matter, I cannot represent even a 
small portion of them. Rather, I intend my selections—and the examinations they bear—as 
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examples of how others can adapt my premises to larger cross-sections. Indeed, it is my sincere 
hope to encourage a critical discussion, not to conclude one.  
 
Theoretical Background 
Changes in an understanding of self are also changes in an understanding of literature, for 
texts are nothing if not the record of our abstractions. As such, any study of consciousness is also 
a study in why and how we tell our stories the way we do. 
We tell our stories, in large part, because of the ideas that first comprise our cultures. 
Dennett, concluding his chapter “The Philosophical Problems of Consciousness,” in 
Consciousness Explained points out an analogue of his idea of the Self as a “Center of Narrative 
Gravity” in David Lodge’s Nice Work:  
[T]here is no such thing as the “Self” on which capitalism and the classic novel are 
founded—that is to say, a finite, unique soul or essence that constitutes a person’s 
identity; there is only a subject position in an infinite web of discourses—the discourses 
of power, sex, family, science, religion, poetry, etc. And by the same token, there is no 
such thing as an author, that is to say, one who originates a work of fiction ab nihilo. . . . 
in the famous words of Jacques Derrida . . . “il n’y pas de hors-texte”, there is nothing 
outside the text. There are no origins, there is only production, and we produce our 
“selves” in language. Not “you are what you eat” but “you are what you speak,” or, 
rather, “you are what speaks you.”8  
 
The idea of being “what speaks you” is as important for works of literature as it is for works of 
self. Literature is what speaks it: its language and the meanings that cohere across time with a 
work’s semantic framework. A metaphor may illustrate my point: a set of blueprints (my 
“semantic framework”—its very, unchanging words) yields roughly the same building even 
when followed by different builders (readers); however, if each of these builders uses different 
materials (i.e. stone, bronze, steel—what “coheres across time”), then the building (the meaning) 
changes each time. If any definition of self simultaneously projects itself into and is delimited by 
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culture, then any definition of self simultaneously projects itself into and is delimited by the art 
(in this case, literature) that comprises part of that culture.9 As such, speakers (being what speaks 
them) feed back into the self-culture discourse partly through expression and art.10 
 Consciousness, self, sentience: these are different names for the same ongoing, interior 
dialog—a communication between states of intention, analysis, disposition, and discrimination. 
Dennett points out that consciousness is the product of the constantly changing and disappearing 
reports offered by excited regions in the brain: 
 Visual stimuli evoke trains of events in the cortex that gradually yield   
 discriminations of greater and greater specificity. At different times and   
 different places, various “decisions” or “judgements” are made; more   
 literally, parts of the brain are caused to go into states that discriminate   
 different features. . . . These localized discriminative states transmit effects  
 to other places, contributing to further discriminations, and so forth. . . .11 
 
These localized discriminative states react not only to each other but also to themselves as they 
await (and take part in) re-stimulation and alteration by the process of negotiating meaning from 
trends in cognitive disposition. There exists no ghost in the machine—consciousness makes itself 
as it goes, and it writes away its obsolete forms by the instant. 
The process of excited neural regions negotiating meaning from their own and each 
other’s reports is a capstone in Dennett’s concept of consciousness, which he calls the “Multiple 
Drafts” model: 
 These editorial processes occur over large fractions of a second, during   
 which time various additions, incorporations, emendations, and    
 overwritings can occur, in various orders. We don’t directly experience   
 what happens on our retinas, in our ears, on the surface of our skin. What   
 we actually experience is a product of many processes of interpretation—  
 editorial processes, in effect. They take in relatively raw and one-sided   
 representation, and yield collated, revised, enhanced representations, and   
 they take place in the streams of activity occurring in various parts of the   
 brain.12 
 
The multiple drafts model argues against a number of pervasive myths about consciousness, 
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namely the Cartesian theater and the central meaner. There is no region in the brain where all of 
these data, all of these negotiations, come together for the benefit of us, the selves in control of 
our bodies (Dennett’s “Cartesian Theater”). Furthermore, there is no central voice directing our 
utterances—nor is it capable of conversational strategy (the “Central Meaner”). It does not exist; 
as Ernest Keen points out, “[Consciousness] has structure, or structures, within which it is what it 
is and does what it does. Many candidates can be listed for structures of consciousness, for 
example: Space, time, self, body, gender, reflection, language.”13 The leaderless activity of 
discriminatory regions of the mind generates the illusion of a central mindspace where mental 
images are viewed by us (as differentiated from both our thoughts and bodies, both of which we 
tend to think we own). These discriminatory regions announce that the perceptual content it is 
their job (at least, one of their jobs) to care about has appeared in the meaning-negotiation. When 
the discriminatory regions make these announcements, they offer unto the negotiation any 
surviving records (if any yet exist: Dennett’s aforementioned “overwriting”) of past 
announcements as well as any memory-fragments—which we generally consider more complete 
than they genuinely are. This process yields what Dennett considers the narrative of self-hood:  
 These strings or streams of narrative issue forth as if from a single source   
 —not just in the obvious physical sense of flowing from just one mouth,   
 or one pencil or pen, but in a more subtle sense: their effect on any   
 audience is to encourage them to (try to) posit a unified agent whose   
 words they are, about whom they are: in short, to posit a center of    
 narrative gravity.14  
 
We, the selves, the consciousnesses, are the combined whole of these many and varied 
processes; we are operational metaphors that arise out of our interaction with ourselves, others 
around us, and the larger cultures beyond. That is not to say that we are slaves to unseen 
impulses (not entirely, in any event); we are those impulses.15  
 In addition to their roles in the multiple drafts model, the regions of the brain that excite 
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themselves when the content they care about becomes present (either in the meaning-negotiation 
or as raw perceptual data from out-there-in-the-world) also play roles in the enacting or 
perpetuation of ideas. We call these ideas memes, and they are capable arranging themselves into 
the most pervasive complexes of our worlds.16 The anthropologist Catherine Lutz has isolated 
“motivation” in one of these complexes, and although her use of the term works quite well 
narratologically, she focuses primarily on the larger “culture” complex: 
 To say that culture provides the self with motivation is to say that the   
 child, in the course of growing up, learns what is desirable, what should be  
 sought, and what should be avoided. If we consider emotions to be the   
 most fundamental form of motivation, then the process of enculturation   
 includes the acquisition of culturally appropriate emotional responses to   
 particular events and other persons. Motivation on the individual level,   
 moreover, provides the basis for the maintenance of culture and its   
 institutions.17 
 
In this case, many of the dispositions (we might also call them filters) consciousness uses to 
organize its data are the results of Lutz’s enculturated motivations. We use aspects of culture as 
aspects of ourselves, and this assists each of us in knowing what to do with what we perceive.18  
Under this model, our regions-of-the-brain do not simply negotiate the meaning of 
perceptual data; they also determine what is worth consciously perceiving in the first place.19 
The memes, which we might simply call “codes” for what we should do with certain negotiated 
meaning—not only from “out there” in the world, but also in abstract, predictive thought—
dictate what we should do or what we should feel when a negotiated meaning fits a specific 
memetic bill.20 So, when I said that we are not slaves to unseen impulses, I meant it. However, 
the idea that we are ghosts controlling our machines, reacting as we see fit, strategizing as free 
agents, and doing what we want to do falls apart under this synthesis of Dennett’s and Lutz’s 
theories. Again, we are operational illusions, abstractions that our bio-cognitive selves draw for 
easy self-reference and feedback as well as coherence within the discursive environments of self-
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other, self-community, and self-world relationships. Our memes very often determine what we 
do in these relationships—they are not ideas we form after the fact. 
In the world of literary narration, the motivation behind focalization is, similarly, not a 
product of the ghost in the narrator’s (or author’s) machine but of memetics and culture instead. 
This assumes that authors model narrators and characters after our ideas about consciousness, or, 
at least, that we decode what we read about these narrators or characters according to what we 
know about ourselves, how we think, and what consequences this knowledge has for us. Dennett 
asks, “What foundation, then, can we stand on as we struggle to keep our feet in the memestorm 
in which we are engulfed?” To borrow his own answer, there is no we (as Cartesian dualism has, 
for so long, taught us to understand that term) to either stand or struggle in the first place.21 
Memes are not biology, they are behavior. As Keen points out, 
 [C]onsciousness expresses its intentionality, simultaneously attuned to   
 multiple layers of meaning, through behavior visible to others who, like   
 itself, are embodied and through their bodies are sensitive to the same   
 world. We can add that these sensibilities are codified into cultural   
 categories of meaning, so that it is not only the same world. It is a shared   
 world. Consciousness without a world, consciousness without a body,   
 consciousness without behavior that bodily engages the world is a mere   
 abstraction, an imaginary unicorn of psychology, nowhere presented as   
 data.22  
 
Though far more experimental and far more free in form than real consciousness, narrators and 
focalizors offer points of departure into the dialog between culture and consciousness by being 
not only a model of that dialog, but one of its artifacts as well.23 
 So far, my examination of memetics in perception and focalization has simply been a 
discussion of what we do with what we learn. The important difference is that we do not simply 
gather memes as our brains see fit. However, memetics differs from other behavioral analyses in 
that it propones that we do not acquire our behaviors; rather, our behaviors acquire us. Memes 
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communicate themselves through the verbal, visual, or cultural instructions of others. We, in 
turn—motivated by those memes already at work within us—may mimic these ideas, even if 
they are not good.24 Furthermore, if my study simply catalogued how we use what we learn, it 
would be yet another unnecessary model of categorization.25 The memes that acquire us do not 
simply reside in our brains until we expire; they replicate themselves through us and feed back 
into the cultural discourses that delimit not only how we build our own worlds, but how we build 
those in literature as well.26 
 
Analysis 
Transferring memetics from cognitive theory to literary analysis is problematic. Any 
reader knows that a story is not a consciousness; furthermore, many argue that literature need not 
even be modeled on consciousness. After all, there are no regions of a story processing the 
meaning of its utterances, and of course, the story perceives nothing, so there is no negotiation of 
meaning within it. Time can do as it pleases in literature; association can mean causation; and 
typically (and most dangerously for a study of consciousness) events can be motivated at the 
narrative level, meaning that a story’s unknown end results (or sustained overall purpose) can 
determine both the existence and the path of any narrative event. However, Scholes reminds us 
that “. . . if we must acknowledge that reality inevitably eludes our human languages, we must 
admit as well that these languages can never conduct the human imagination to a point beyond 
this reality.”27 Literature is language, and it seems it has nowhere to go but back to us, back to 
Scholes’s “reality.” No matter the scope of experimentation in a literary work; no matter the 
fragmented, surreal juxtaposition of its images; no matter its non- or a-human characters—as C. 
S. Lewis said, “What is new usually wins its way by disguising itself as the old.”28 We 
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understand what is new by comparing it against what we already know. As Scholes points out, 
“We leap to familiar meanings as we leap to recognize the person of someone we know from a 
glimpse of a face or the shadow of a gesture. All our interpretive processes proceed in quantum 
jumps from apprehended parts to imagined wholes or gestalts.”29 As such, how we understand 
consciousness informs how we understand our “cultural artifacts”—in this case, literature. 
Indeed, our understandings inform the creation of these artifacts, so even if a character is not an 
accurate model of human consciousness, it ultimately results from the negotiations of our 
consciousnesses. Looking for these creative processes in a character, narrator, or focalizor can 
show us how to find them in ourselves and in our cultures (even how to find our struggles 
against these processes).  
In addition to its other accomplishments, Kelly Link’s short story, “Lull,” measures a 
number of gaps between concepts of self.30 One of her narrators regularly presents explicit 
logical formulae and then, immediately, either confirms or violates them. For example, when the 
narrative turns to the strange house off of the highway, we read that the hermit “had an 
arrangement with a grocer. The grocer sent a boy up to the house once every two weeks, and the 
boy brought the mail, too” (57). Here, the narrator establishes a logical formula: the hermit 
requires groceries, so a local grocer, via his boy, fulfills the need. However, the next line in the 
paragraph reads, “but there wasn’t ever any mail.” The logical formula has been violated: 1) 
hermit requires both his food and mail delivered 2) grocer sends an employee to that end 3) there 
never was any mail. Had the narrator said “and the boy was supposed to bring the mail” or “had 
there ever been any mail, the boy would have brought that, too,” there would be no violation of 
the formula; rather, there would only be validations of it—i.e. 1) hermit requires food and mail 
2) grocer sends a boy to deliver food and, if there is any, mail 3) there never is any mail. Under 
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the existing circumstances, the boy brings the mail there never is. Shortly after, the narrator tells 
us, still discussing the hermit, that “People said they saw him. Or they didn’t see him. That was 
the point” (57). Here, the narrator reports a logical formula that stands to reason: onlookers can 
report that 1) they saw the hermit 2) they did not see him. The text presents no violation of this 
formula; however, its inclusion, like the one above, mimics the recognition, analysis, and action 
that occurs when a real consciousness negotiates meaning with itself.31  
That most texts do not sketch the logical formulae they manifest or violate so explicitly 
calls attention to the calling-attention-to of the logical formulae in “Lull.” Link’s narrator 
reveals—in ways other stories (indeed, most real events) do not—what Dennett calls “perceptual 
sets” or “semantic readiness” and what the cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser calls “schemata” 
or “priming” (discussion to follow). The oscillation between confirmations and violations of the 
these explicit logical formulae in “Lull” destabilizes how readers progress through the text—it is 
never certain which will happen. Creating such “semantic unreadiness” is part of what makes the 
borders between narrators and narrated, conscious and inanimate so unclear in the story. 
Essentially, it is a cognitive exposure of David Bohm’s problems with categorization. 
There are reasons why we come to our conclusions, both in real life and in the literature 
we read. Similarly, there are reasons that inform, if they do not necessarily explain, how 
characters, narrators, and focalizors come to their conclusions. Neisser, in his essay “The 
Development of Consciousness and the Acquisition of Skill,” explains that 
. . . after a while, the characteristics of the self and the environment become  
familiar, so familiar that they are no longer discovered but merely confirmed. . . .  
If something is confirmed, it must first have been anticipated; if it was  
anticipated, some mental structure corresponding to it must have existed in  
advance. In almost all modern cognitive theories, such structures are called  
schemata.32 
 
“Lull,” then, makes clear as it goes the assumptions it makes about itself—that is, what it knows 
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about how it operates that readers (also characters, narrators, and focalizors), guided by their 
own memospheres, do not. This creates a cognitive map of the processes of consciousness that 
inform the motivations (and, in turn, the focalizations) in the story. By revealing its “schemata” 
as it goes, “Lull” aligns itself with both its readers and its narrators, in that their assumptions and 
confirmations (or those they represent) become similar to its. When the borders between narrator 
and narrated become unclear in the story, “Lull” violates this alignment, throwing its readers into 
a worsened state of semantic readiness and inviting them to recognize, as it does, the gaps 
between what tells a story (or consciousness) and who it is told to. As Lutz points out, culture 
and individual each serve the other in the process of replicating memes and delineating 
appropriate responses to perceived data. 
Yet, memetics does more than simply inform literature—it is also active within in it and 
so, in turn, within readers. A story like “Lull” does not simply encourage its readers to remember 
that ideas theoretically determined the creation of the story’s consciousnesses and consciousness-
actions—the text also demonstrates memes in action. Isolating the motivations behind 
characters’ or narrators’ actions, when considered meta-memetically, reveal that the story does 
not simply dictate its events according to its end result, running conceits, or stylistic intentions. 
There are also cultural motivations behind the ideas authors group together, possibly, to effect 
end results, conceits, etc. This is to say that, while stories can be—indeed, often have been—
studied at the narrative level, how and why we think also informs the juxtaposition of narrative 
elements. 
To best examine active memes in a text, let us establish first that the memes we encounter 
when reading often situate themselves in our (the readers’) memospheres. After we read a story, 
those memes (ideas) that successfully acquire us become part of our meaning-negotiations in the 
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real world—that is, of course, if a cultural discourse that rose around these memes has not 
already acquired us before we even read the story. For example, the meme of shape-changing as 
a metaphor for alienation has already acquired many readers who have not yet read Kafka’s 
“Metamorphosis,” where this particular meme “breeds” quite effectively. When, and if, they read 
the story, the meme would only be reinforcing itself, not acquiring them anew.  
To return to active memes in “Lull,” however: we broaden our understanding of the 
characters’ actions and personalities when we uncover memes-in-action instead of reading the 
same simply as ghost-in-the-machine decision-making. One of the narrators in “Lull” states that 
“Ed liked to make up games. People paid him to make up games. Back when we had a regular 
poker night, he was always teaching us a new game and this game would be based on a TV show 
or some dream he’d had” (54). Here, Ed acts according to meme-clusters that reinforce not only 
his ideas but also his job—he is a game designer. The operative question becomes “Does ‘Ed’—
the central meaner, the ghost in the machine, the one who ‘owns’ the brain—like to make up 
games, or is this simply the convergence of the varied ‘make-games’ ideas in his memosphere?” 
In fact, since Ed is his memosphere, the question is really why he is acting on and perpetuating 
game-making memes, not if. He is dispositionally more concerned, in this instance, with 
reinforcing game memes than others. When Ed goes on to claim “We’ll need to play fast—no 
stopping to think about it—just do what I tell you to do” (54), we see that the memes at work 
here have involved what we might metaphorically call a sub-routine that makes their enacting, 
their transmission, even more likely: a voluntary suppression of other conscious meaning-
negotiation. The players in Ed’s game are not to bother weighing and judging the results of his 
latest memospheric convergence; rather, they are to quiet the process and give all primary 
processing over entirely to the game. Whatever conclusions we might form about what roles 
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Ed’s game-making plays in regards to character interaction or overall narrative effect, we must 
begin by examining how and why these roles exist (as extrapolated from our real world from 
which they draw their meaning) in the first place.33 From this, any number of abstractions, 
fragmentations, deconstructions, or experiments may follow, but if they are to have any anchor at 
all in the meanings of the conscious arena, then they begin within it.  
Of course, readers whose consciousnesses are the products of different cultural discourses 
can come to different conclusions about semiotic extrapolation from real world meaning, so 
while the New Critics argued that a text is itself in a vacuum, they were right. They only failed to 
realize that somebody has to remove it from this hermetic envelope before he or she can read it. 
That somebody, Lutz reminds us, is also a culture. 
These sorts of memetic and focalizational analyses reveal how stories can, unlike real 
life, build realities that deconstruct the rules of our own. They can do this because authors 
extrapolate them from the elements of consciousness in controlled environments —they are 
written through to their ends and are collections of strategically included elements. Unlike real 
life, the excluded elements do not ever even enter into a reader’s conscious periphery, meaning, 
for example, that the idea that “association means causation” can be functionally true. In real life 
this cannot be so certain—only causation can guarantee association, not the other way around. In 
The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, Tzvetan Todorov refers to this as the 
“fragility of the limit between matter and mind.” He explains that “This principle engenders 
several fundamental themes: a special causality, pan-determinism; multiplication of the 
personality; collapse of the limit between subject and object; and lastly, the transformation of 
time and space.”34 Thus, in Alex Irvine’s “Gus Dreams of Biting the Mailman,” when the 
narrator states that “It should be interjected at this point that Mitch Packard had a problem with 
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coincidence, or perhaps with probability, or causality,” this narrator is telling us that not only do 
memes about convergence and synchronicity affect Mitch’s behavior, they also affect the very 
reality Mitch perceives around him—association (synchronicity) can mean causation.35  
As I mentioned previously, we must internalize all aspects of exterior reality (its 
“affordances,” its noteworthy aspects, its very shape) and negotiate their meanings through the 
various aspects of our consciousnesses. This means there can be no approach to reality (to intone 
an oft-heard refrain)—there can only be abstractions about it drawn from each thinker’s 
experiences, dispositions, and negotiations of meaning. So, while Mitch’s reality is no more 
certain than any of ours, a good number of us get along “normally” enough in the world 
according to what we have internalized (what reality we have built) about it—that means we 
must consider the possibility that Mitch (or a real internalization like him), within the story’s 
deconstruction of our reality, can be just as likely to get along well enough: to be, as close as we 
can get, real. So though his reality, his internalization, might simply portray someone’s from the 
real world who allows for extra-empirical influences on reality (i.e. someone in our world in 
whose reality association can guarantee causation), it might also portray any person whose world 
allows only for empirical, logical, or scientific influences on the convergence of reality. This 
marks an excellent struggle between memes—some strengthen the architecture of an empirical 
reality, yet some (like those perpetuated in “Gus Dreams”) challenge to the idea. Neither is good 
or bad—they are only more or less successful on their own replicative, influencing terms, where 
more replication equates to greater “survival.”36 “Gus Dreams” furthers these differing memetic 
agendas simultaneously, privileging neither. Analyzing the story at the narrative, narrated, and 
focalizing levels, as we have done, reveals the architecture of “the fantastic” in its pure sense. It 
is a collision of memes not unlike those occurring within real-world consciousness as they 
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compete to acquire replicators: us. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, memetics argues 
that before we could read about this collision, before it could motivate focalization and 
determine its own inclusion in narration, it had to come from someone, it had to be replicated—
in this case by Irvine. Memes exist as easily in consciousness as they do in the pages of a story. 
So how does any of this change how we read stories? After all, one might argue that all I 
have done is map, in very complicated terms, how authors put stories together. The end result is 
the same—the text does not change. Really, what I have proposed here is a new awareness about 
internalizing worlds—real or fictional. A story is never about a world—it never even involves a 
world. Unless we make allowances for non-human yet capable-of-human-thought narrators, all 
stories are reports and assemblies of how the real we will never truly know can come together in 
ways that destabilize or question (via the story’s inherently memetic nature) how we have 
internalized existence—how our ideas and memes have internalized it. In “Lull” the text moves, 
in large part, metonymically. That is, subordinate ideas or images in one paragraph link, like the 
processes of cognition themselves, to the content of the next paragraph. The same applies to the 
various sections of the story, wherein each time, the created in one becomes the creator in the 
next. We find the same idea in Jeffrey Ford’s “The Yellow Chamber,” in Jonathan Lethem’s 
“The Dystopianist, Thinking of His Rival Is Interrupted by a Knock on the Door,” in Forrest 
Aguirre’s “The Reverie Styx.”37  Are these maps of authorial internalization? Perhaps. We 
cannot know. They are, however, maps of causality and creation. They are not Scholes’s 
“nonsense”—they “mean” (like E. Sedia’s “Munashe and the Spirits,” like Jason Erik 
Lundberg’s “One Less,” or like Barth Anderson’s “We Stand on the Verge of Getting it On”) 
their own creation, and we realize, as we leave the stories, that they cannot point, even as 
hypothetical fiction, to how anything “actually happened.”38 If the agents in any of the above 
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stories signify, even remotely, the idea of people, whose consciousnesses revise and redact 
memory instant-by-instant, then which versions of what happens are we getting? What has 
happened to our memories of what we read earlier in the stories by the time we read the final 
lines? What happens as the memes in the stories acquire and change us? Did the elements that 
built the stories’ climaxes actually converge as narrated? After all, are not narrators us? Are they 
not the ability to tell stories, which is us? Even if we concede that literature exists in stasis as 
inherently not us, reading it has effects on us—it affects how we understand; how, as the 
cognitive theorists I engaged earlier demonstrate, we exist; how we internalize stories. In this 
sense, ultimately, when read, stories work like we do. 
 At this point in our examination of consciousness and focalization, we should logically 
move into a discussion about mimesis versus poïesis, but that is getting away from the immediate 
study. I will address this in greater, and more appropriate, length elsewhere. For now, to frame a 
departure from this discussion and move into another, let me say simply that the arguments 
between literature as purely mimetic (representative of reality) or purely poïetic (creating its own 
entirely) do not divide as cleanly as many have asserted. In fact, it is always, as I hope I have 
revealed, a combination of both. As Scholes points out, “It is because reality cannot be recorded 
that realism is dead. . . . We do not imitate the world, we construct versions of it. There is no 
mimesis, only poïesis.”39 Yet, poïesis must begin with what is available, and therein lies, 
crippled as it is, Scholes’s missing mimesis.  
My analysis of new ideas in consciousness and their effects on the little weird, though it 
appears to favor literature as an exact translation of mind (of materialism), argue only that we 
begin negotiating personal meaning from art according how we negotiate any meaning. From 
this mimetic departure, all art creates—if, by no other means, than by how it makes realities by 
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what it excludes, what we can never recover since it never existed. In this sense, literature is 
para-mimetic.   
 
Conclusion. 
In the end, fiction is fiction; it is not an accurate and veridical report of memetic 
transmission and cultural discourse. To return to Scholes, literature means only itself: “Criticism 
has taken the very idea of ‘aboutness’ away from us. It has taught us that language is 
tautological, if it is not nonsense, and to the extent that it is about anything it is about itself.”40 
However, much to the dismay of the New Critic, people write stories, people embedded in (or 
caught between) cultures and epistemologies. We might not understand the world any more by 
studying its art, but we will certainly understand art more by studying its world. It is important to 
remember, as artistic expression embraces more and more the un-intentional (simply self-
meaning) utterance, that if utterances and stories do not have to mean anything other than 
themselves, then neither do people or the demographics they belong to. Existence without 
“meaning” may not be enough, but it provides a far more stable exploratory environment than 
the theoretical arenas that try to paint comprehensive portraits of existence by looking at things 
from only one viewpoint. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SELF-WEIRD WORLD: 
 PROBLEMS OF BEING AS THE FANTASTIC INVASION 
None of this is as simple as it sounds, but one must start somewhere even though such 
placement inevitably entails the telling of a lie. 
Karen Joy Fowler 
 
Introduction 
 There is a prevailing sentiment in the worlds of scientific, materialist study that the world 
is not strange—not in any of the more bizarre forms exhibited by the little weird. This sentiment 
has been, then, one of the prevailing criteria defining one artistic genre from another, mimetic 
versus non-mimetic, and relevant versus not. To explore how the little weird maps its own 
poetics and their relation to the world, we must do away with this mistaken sentiment, for the 
experimentation in the little weird is not, as is commonly thought, what estranges the work from 
realistic, naturalistic, or mimetic work—indeed, these techniques are what align the little weird 
more closely than most other categories with cognition.  
In the little weird, the fantastic or the strange does not invade the normal to an 
“estranging” or “dissonant” effect; rather, the normal invades upon the strange, which is the form 
of self, of consciousness, and of cognition itself. As a result, mundane problems of being become 
the ungraspable fantastic, and not the timeslips, identity-blurs, recursions, and other common 
tropes of experimentation. In The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, Tzvetan 
Todorov points out that Sartre first identified this trend when studying Kafka and Blanchot. 
“According to Sartre,” Todorov tells us, “Blanchot and Kafka no longer try to depict 
extraordinary beings; for them, ‘there is now only one fantastic object: man. Not the man of 
religions and spiritualism, only half committed to the world of the body, but man-as-given, man-
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as-nature, man-as-society . . .’”1 Todorov concludes that “The ‘normal’ man is precisely the 
fantastic being; the fantastic becomes the rule, not the exception.”2 This, in many ways, directly 
opposes the formula for more realistic, naturalistic, or mimetic fiction. It is this opposition, I 
argue, that brings the little weird into closer step with how selves, consciousness, and narratives 
of being actually function. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 The state of the world out there—beyond the self—arises from perception. Of course, 
there are infinitely many processes occurring in phenomenal space irrespective of any observing 
or participating self; however, their independence from our observation does not follow them 
into the worlds of our selves. In Wholeness and the Implicate Order, David Bohm begins his 
deconstruction of reality by elucidating the difference between what occurs out there and how 
consciousness reconciles itself with it: “. . . fragmentation is continually being brought about by 
the almost universal habit of taking the content of our thought for ‘a description of the world as it 
is.’”3 There is no such thing as a purely objective observer.4 Further, the idea that external 
phenomena (as we process them) are un-strange, mundane, and logically progressive is simply a 
normalizing narrative that selves tell themselves and each other. As such, any literature that fails 
to take this into account in its attempts to “realistically” portray the condition self is neither 
mimetic, realistic, nor naturalistic. It is, as I have said previously, poïetic—it is creating, not 
representing; it is perpetuating a narrative of the mundane by adopting the material of the normal 
environment and para-mimetically arranging it into a decidedly anti-cognitive flow of events.5 
 According to Catherine Lutz’s theory of self-culture discourse, the larger narratives of 
what a given culture is and what it is to be a part of that culture determine how a self should 
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respond to what it perceives.6 This is how, for example, two different selves negotiated by two 
different self-culture discourses might look differently upon (and react differently to) something 
as extreme as, say, cannibalism. One of these selves, a Western one, for example, might see a 
horrific ritual—it is there, in the outside world, being perceived. However, the other self, one 
from a culture that practices cannibalism, would not see the same thing. No horrific ritual exists 
in its world. It sees, perhaps, religious transcendence, cultural solidity, or any number of other 
phenomena—it may not even see the eating of flesh at all but a metaphysical Eucharist instead. 
Which is correct? Both, of course. Each self has been built from a life-long immersion in cultural 
discourse, and each is guided by specific memes that delimit evaluation and response. What is 
more, one of these selves may have already begun “creating” cannibalism in its cognitive model 
of the world. If this self merely observes what it considers associated aspects of “possibly-
cannibalism” (i.e. primitive huts, aggressive tribal dancing, drawings of heads on leathern 
windows), these aspects can create “cannibalism in the immediate world” before it has even been 
perceived. In his study of the processes of perception and how a mimetically driven narrative of 
self creates them, Daniel C. Dennett explains the “analysis-by-synthesis” model of perception, 
which states that 
perceptions are built up in a process that weaves back and forth between centrally 
generated expectations, on the one hand, and confirmations (and disconfirmations) 
arising from the periphery on the other hand (e.g., Neisser, 1967). The general idea of 
these theories is that after a certain amount of “preprocessing” has occurred in the early 
or peripheral layers of the perceptual system, the tasks of perception are completed—
objects are identified, recognized, categorized—by generate-and-test cycles. In such a 
cycle, one’s current expectations and interests shape hypotheses for one’s perceptual 
systems to confirm or disconfirm, and a rapid sequence of such hypothesis generations 
and confirmations produces the ultimate product, the ongoing, updated ‘model’ of the 
world of the perceiver. Such accounts of perception are motivated by a variety of 
considerations, both biological and epistemological . . .”7 
 
A self cannot remove itself from the motivated processing of what it perceives. The functions of 
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self and the functions of perception co-occur in the same materialist brain-operations. 
Furthermore, which data warrant sustaining in the ongoing narrative of self (that is, which 
warrant even being noticed and held in attention for any but the briefest of Dennett’s revisionist 
instants) is determined by the disposition of those memes that have acquired the self in question. 
In some extreme self-worlds, the cannibalism scene would not even exist if the self in question 
were not motivated to sustain it in its ongoing report of self-and-situation.8 A self’s anxieties 
determine the construction of its world. 
  In George Saunders’s “Sea Oak,” the self narrating the story builds a world that includes 
a risen corpse as manifested narratorial anxiety. The narrator-self struggles with the threat of the 
mundane swallowing the story’s characters (which, it must be recalled, the narrator-self has 
created: their appearances, utterances, even their very existence are all determined by what the 
narrator-self is motivated to focalize into its narrative). Further, though the story is narrated in 
first-person, we cannot know definitively if this is a self, an “I,” that the narrator has created for 
itself or if the narrative is as simple as the main character creating a story—postmodern relativism 
dictates that it must interpretively be both. The narrator understands the main character as a 
middling stripper who caters primarily to women: “What a stressful workplace. The minute your 
Cute Rating drops, you’re a goner. Guests rank us as Knockout, Honeypie, Adequate, or Stinker. . 
. . I’m a solid Honeypie/Adequate . . .” (88).9 The main character and his sisters live paycheck-to-
paycheck, nearly beyond their means and locked in a depressing and dangerous normality. Later, 
when their peaceful aunt Bernie dies, the narrator realizes she died “Scared to death in a crappy 
apartment” (93). When Aunt Bernie, who throughout her life experienced only the steady 
mundane, dies, she becomes a perfect (no longer changing) form—an expired self that, for certain 
now, will never escape the very-normal oppression that the main character also suffers from. 
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When Bernie resurrects and reappears in the apartment as a foul-mouthed, determined problem-
solver, the narrator has her tell the main character “‘You gotta get us out of here!’” (106). Bernie 
gives supernatural, perfected voice to the very anxieties that inform the main character’s 
negotiation of self. The narrator builds a world for him that is fully informed by his concerns 
about never improving his lot. What he perceives is based on what the narrator (again, either 
another self or, in fact, himself) needs him to perceive, and the reader is left only with this is how 
it is for him. The realness of Bernie’s resurrection is beyond discussion. 
 
Analysis 
Since a self must internalize everything out there in the world  before it can negotiate 
relevance or meaning, what is out there and what it is doing become subordinate questions to 
what narrative of space a memeplex-self needs to tell itself, and why. One of the seemingly most 
primary of these narratives of space must be the story of physics. The processes scientists have 
charted (and we have accepted) regarding the behavior of real space (terrestrial or non) are 
wholly alien and impossible in the internalized versions of space a consciousness represents to 
itself. Ernest Keen isolates the disparity between what seems to be going on in real space 
(according to which physical laws) and what is going on in “experiential space” (according to no 
rules but those that serve the narrative of self) in “Being Conscious is Being-in-the-World”: 
Experiential space, like experiential time, freely violates the conceptual framework of 
physics and functions. Physical objects occupy space, and the space they occupy is the 
geometric space of the Newtonian world. . . . But finally we have to say that conscious 
phenomena simply do not occupy the space of the Newtonian world. They have no 
Newtonian location.10 
 
The physics of experiential space can involve non-physical tableaux such as, for example, the 
detailed daydream-envisioning of being able to fly; the sudden, atemporal appearance of a 
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deceased-relative phantasm for a conversation in mindspace; or even the rapid and often 
unconnected teleportation of a mapped self from one physical location to another. This means, 
that as phenomena from the external world are internalized and pieced together to build a para-
mimetic world from a few real, physical building blocks out there, they are stripped of their 
inherent real world characteristics, processed through the anti-Newtonian self-world negotiation, 
and then only nominally re-given crude maps of those now-missing real world characteristics—
most of which will default to the strictures of reality allowed by the self-culture discourse and 
not a self-science one. Few selves indeed keep accurate understandings of Brownian motion, the 
Phi effect, or the Oort Cloud in mind as they work through their everyday negotiations between 
themselves and the world beyond. The discriminatory, fragmentary, anti-Newtonian processes of 
sustaining a self and a world to move through, in this model, are hardly invulnerable to 
incorporating the weird into empirical reality. Indeed, these few examples paint a very weird 
portrait of consciousness. 
 In regards to experiential space, what applies, in regards to theory, to a literary narrative 
applies as well to narratives of self and space. When Todorov offered his defining summary of 
“fantastic” literature, he was mapping divisions between literary phenomena; however, his work 
concentrates decidedly on what is real as opposed to what is not as a measure of genre 
classification.11  
In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without devils, 
sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws of 
this same familiar world. The person who experiences the event must opt for one of two 
possible solutions: either he is the victim of an illusion of the sense, of a product of the 
imagination—and laws of the world then remain what they are; or else the event has 
indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality—but then this reality is controlled by 
laws unknown to us. Either the devil is an illusion, an imaginary being; or else he really 




But, again, Todorov means literary events attempting to signify real-world principles.13 
Mindspace events do not signify experience the same way—they are experience.14 What exists 
in the materialist functioning of a consciousness is real, even if it is only a fragmentary, 
atemporal invasion into the more-or-less cohesive negotiation of consciousness. A person who 
sees a red-capped gnome frolicking for the briefest instant through the landscapes of his or her 
experiential space may actually believe in the creature, may take it as a manifested metaphor 
built from his or her cultural framework or personal anxieties, or may regard it merely as a flight 
of fancy taken from a lifetime of exposure to art and myth.15 Regardless, the effects on the self-
narrative are real. If it exists in a mind, it influences cognitive world-building, which is where 
real life takes place. Indeed, even many real world features that influence self-creation are 
merely the expressions of other selves. We live and build ourselves in an ongoing dialogue of 
expression, not only in a linguistic sense or in Lutz’s cultural sense, but also in a tangible sense. 
Anything man-made is an expression of other selves—a type of expression we have long since 
reconciled with our many negotiations.16 
 Thus, in Doug Lain’s “The ‘84 Regress,” when the main character’s world becomes 
phantasmagoric, we cannot simply call it a hallucination. The main character, at various points in 
the story, suffers withdrawal from a variety of pills, each of which cognitively normalize the 
taker so that he or she lives in (thinks in) a prescribed cultural situation—a steady cultural 
situation. As was the case with Saunders’s “Sea Oak,” readers cannot definitively conclude 
whether the main character is narrating his own story or if a different narrator has created the 
main character identity as an expression of its own self. This means that when the main character 
tells us that “The future is a hallucination,” (9) we have to take the line both literally and 
figuratively.17 The main character sees “it shimmering across the horizon, a city of cylinders and 
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squares, and [is] amazed at how it floats,” but of course, what he is seeing has been taken 
piecemeal from the environment, internalized, loaded with semantic, cognitive, self-world 
meaning, and then sustained in the self’s attention. The narrator (whatever its nature) has 
motivated certain aspects of what is out there beyond the main character for focalization, 
meaning the entire episode is both an invocation of motivated-perception world-building for the 
main character as well as an actual motivated world-building for the narratorial self—it is its 
own narrative, just as the main character’s narrative of self is within it. 
 Further, the main character tells us that “The Yugo has a television screen where there 
was once a speedometer, and there is a jet stream where the exhaust pipe used to be” (9). While 
these may be hallucinations created by the main character’s neuro-chemical imbalance, they are 
also very easily simply the metaphoric processes of consciousness at work. Thoughts of 
televisions and jet streams can very easily enter the self-world negotiation if there are memes or 
other cognitive dispositions at work that can, in some way, contribute to sustaining the main 
character’s self or assist with orienting him in the world according to selfly need. That is to say 
“television” can interrupt one’s thought at any time. Anything can, and does so regularly. The 
main character’s experiential space is not Newtonian—it will be whatever it needs to and 
whenever it needs to as best suits the self’s interests. That the self may think in metaphor 
(linguistic or imagistic) is only, as Dennett points out, part of its operation. Moreover, according 
to Bohm’s thought-is-experience observation, what occurs in the main character’s experiential 
space (as well as what is occurring in the narrator’s) is real experience. Hallucination or not, the 
weird events in “The ‘84 Regress” are part of a modeled self’s world, and each event is the 
culmination of varying crises of existence, identity, biology, and acculturation. 
 This principle is, of course, not limited to only one author. When the weird occurs in Ed 
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Park’s “Well-Moistened with Cheap Wine, the Sailor and the Wayfarer Sing of Their Absent 
Sweethearts,” it takes many forms: multiplicity of self (every woman on the island is named 
Tina), the collapse of distance and cartography (the location and motility of the research-island), 
and unstable history (the uncertain nature of the linguistic artifacts the Tinas’ study).18 Each of 
these events and all of them together, instead of being simply strange aspects of a non-mimetic 
story, are a model of consciousness. For Tina, the main character—and for the narrators, 
motivators, and focalizors involved in maneuvering her-as-narrative through the strange island—
these events are the stuff of experiential space, anxiety, culture, and expression, to name a few. 
Tina thinking is Tina experiencing, and consciousness, as we have seen, is not a steady or 
“normal” operation. The story makes sense of itself by making a place of itself, where concerns 
of being can be modeled, extrapolated, tested, corrected, and then re-internalized both by itself 
(once the narration reaches its end, then the story knows its own teleology from the beginning) 
and by its readers, who are acquired by the many and varied memes of “Well-Moistened with 
Cheap Wine.” We might say the same of China Miéville’s “Familiar,” which metaphorizes the 
accumulation of experiences and tracks the acquisition-by-memes that results in a 
consciousness.19 Nevermind that sentient piles of gathering rubbish do not acquire consciousness 
in the real world—once the story’s memes have acquired a reader, Miéville’s story is now an 
entirely new, neat-and-tidy thought-metaphor at the ready when thinkers later envision the 
collecting of consciousness. Interstellar dust rarely ends in consciousness either, yet we have a 
name for that story: The History of Our Universe.  
“Familiar” is a thought (in that reading it is a cognitive process), and thought, of course, 
is experience. Experience, in turn, informs how we build our selves and our worlds, and we may 
just come to characterize something real down the line in terms of “Familiar” or of “The ‘84 
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Regress” or of “Well-Moistened with Cheap Wine” when we try to reconcile the real thing with 
our own narratives of self. There are no landscapes; there are only selves expressing experiential 
spaces, and the weird, not the normal, constitutes their true vocabulary. 
 
Further Analysis 
There are many consequences of the realization that a self is weird—one of the most 
disturbing is how it makes room for the fallacy that “association means causation” or how it 
allows what Todorov calls “pan-determinism,”20 In short, the weirding of self and space can 
make gods and monsters responsible for the events that inform our anxieties of being. As Mieke 
Bal points out in Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, the world becomes 
agentive:  
Spaces function in a story in two ways. On the one hand, they are only a frame, a place of 
action. In this capacity a more or less detailed presentation will lead to a more or less 
concrete picture of that space. The space can also remain entirely in the background. In 
many cases, however, space is “thematized”: it becomes an object of presentation itself, 
for its own sake. Space thus becomes an “acting place” rather than the place of action.21   
 
So, if as Bal observes, places in literary narratives can be imbued with force, agency, or theme, so 
can they be similarly imbued in the narratives of self and world. A place, or many places, can 
either calm or exacerbate a character’s (or self’s) anxieties—his or her concerns about sustaining 
self, these concerns being some of the primary factors determining what one perceives, what 
world one makes. And as Bohm points out, thought is experience—under these circumstances, 
either actual world-building or that which appears in a textual narrative. The often-strangeness of 
world building in the little weird only aligns it even more closely to a human consciousness than 
“realistic” literature in that it both invokes the idea with its characters and activates the process in 
its readers. 
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  A further consequence of “acting places” is that they can become targets of what Keen 
refers to as “affective discharge.” Earlier, I aligned Keen’s theory with how a self comes to notice 
perceptions; in that sense, however, emotion (or “affect”) simply determined Dennett’s “semantic 
readiness.” Under the present focus, the projection of emotion onto the landscape of experiential 
space can become recursive. Keen’s remarks bear re-iterating:  
At yet other times, experience becomes totally caught up in an affective discharge, 
blanketing the perceptual world with a single theme (anger, fear, love), which in turn 
seems to goad behavior against, away from, or toward something or someone in the 
world. Experience, then, both is motivated and motivates.22 
 
A self in the grip of an intense emotion can come to experience all of his or her perceptions as 
temporarily more-than-simply-associated with the elements of phenomenal space. When 
environment moves from a place of action to an acting place, association all too often begins to 
mean causation. Perception and emotion occur in the same brain-space as consciousness itself 
(indeed, are part of consciousness), and the self in question creates his or her world through a 
filter of, for example, anger. Not only is the world, like the self, “angry,” the world can become 
recursively causal in regards to the self’s anger. That is to say an angry self creates its world by 
lifting into attention perceptions from the outside world that cohere with what the angry-self (its 
memes, dispositions, discriminations, and semantic readiness) needs, fears, distrusts, and so forth 
under the given emotional circumstances. Anything in the self’s experiential space (which, as 
noted earlier, may both include objects that are not there in the real world as well as exclude 
those that most certainly are), when part of an acting place can become both target and cause of a 
self’s emotion. For example, the self in question, angered, can become even more angry at a 
suddenly broken vase as well as becoming even more angry because of the suddenly broken 
vase. Here, association means causation: the simple matter of the vase making it into the self’s 
notice associates it with the self’s world-painting affective discharge. Its association becomes 
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causation in that it furthers the self’s anger, and as the rest of the self’s idio-occultism (the 
identifying of phenomena as “cause” when others are, in fact, causing it) attempts to assimilate 
the new anger-causing event (the vase breaking), it can become, even if only momentarily, an 
agent of the self’s anger. One can almost hear the afflicted self wondering aloud why the vase 
broke now, lumping it into the rest of the acting-place, and the idio-occultishly decided-upon 
conspiracy at hand. When this process is coupled with the atemporal, fragmentary, revisionist, 
and metaphor-as-thought negotiation of consciousness, the borders between real and not, 
possible and not, and existent or not become dizzyingly blurred. The world can, in every real 
sense to this beleaguered self, become suddenly “out to get” the self, just as the world (or, for 
example, its gods) can also be out to help it in other situations. Sudden flights of imagination 
create scenarios that either alleviate or exacerbate the angered state, previous conversations can 
be recast to serve the needs of a new narrative self, and even bizarre thought-metaphors all exist 
as experience alongside the self-world negotiation. The self remakes itself (and its constituent 
memories, conclusions, and metaphors) in the instant, effectively revising away its previous 
incarnation, and all to the effect of how best to cope with the problem of the acting place, which 
is, of course, merely the self’s projected anxieties. An acting place, like the self, is another 
metaphor of consciousness, different in only a few ways from the main metaphor of self. We 
might think of it as selfly bilocation. Ulric Neisser elucidates this multiplicity in “The 
Development of Consciousness and the Acquisition of Skill”: 
In imagining what may happen and recalling what has happened, we leave the realm of 
objective awareness. Our consciousness extends to the possible as well as the actual; we 
can anticipate what we would see in entirely imaginary environments. Our conception of 
ourselves is altered, too. Who am I, in that imagined place? I still have a kind of 
ecological self, but it is not this self here. The extended awareness of imagination requires 
an analogously extended ecological self.23   
 
Imagined events (and the anxieties, concerns, dispositions, or emotions that inform them) alter 
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consciousness by extending it into multiple forms. The dialogue between these varied forms and 
our main sense of self is the stuff of self-correction—more specific than a narrative of self, this 
dialogue is a drama of self.  
A self, then, exists in a universe governed by idio-occult logic—in the sense of personal 
ideas about agency, environment, and causality, which, even in the instance of a skeptical, 
Empirical, positivist self, can never be fully objective, neutral, or real. This idio-occult system 
makes greater or lesser allowances for “possible explanations of things” based on the intensity of 
its affective discharge in any given moment. Indeed, idio-occultism can become nearly inactive 
as a self approaches homeostasis (as can the self itself); however, a self can never exorcise its 
tendencies toward occultation entirely—the self is occultation. Even the most vehement 
materialist does not have in his or her mind a comprehensive map of all of the complicated 
processes that govern physical phenomena—he or she often has only piecemeal sketches in mind 
at any given instant, and these sketches can easily create worlds for the vehement materialist 
wherein the sketch (defined, of course, as the memes of self best saw fit) in question becomes, 
inaccurately, the cause of what he or she perceives out there.24 The problem with the idea that 
“association does not mean causation” is that the idea is infinite—one must never cease the 
exploration for deeper causation.25 In this sense, a process of the world out there is fully causing 
something in the self-in-question’s experiential space that it is not actually causing—not by 
itself, not as the ultimate cause. In moments of intense meditation or lucidity, this same self 
might suspend this process of causal explanation, of occultation, but in a moment of affective 
discharge, this is not as likely. The self then is less its self and more its emotion of the moment. 
This holds true for textual selves as well as biological ones. 
One of the clearest examples of affective discharge at work in the little weird occurs in 
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Jason Erik Lundberg’s “One Less.”26 The main character, a salesman locked in his job and at the 
mercy of his employer, is denied the opportunity to spend a birthday with the woman he loves 
because of work demands. From this one lack-of-control irruption into the main character’s 
personal sphere, the character’s world becomes an acting place, animated by the character’s 
projected anxieties about self and control. By degrees, the main character is erased from the 
world of his own experiential space until he is ultimately relegated into the form of a lamp in the 
corner of the room he shared with his former lover, who is now involved with one of the main 
character’s old coworkers. In “One Less,” the world is literally out to get the main character in 
the sense that his inadequate assertions of self and his lack of control have empowered those 
aspects of the environment that his self is motivated to perceive. He bilocates into a world he 
creates that is the projected perfection (the logical conclusion) of the course of his present 
concerns of self. And of course, as Dennett points out, memes may not necessarily be good for a 
self—they are interested primarily in their own perpetuation, in keeping a hold on a self’s 
attention, of being the self. In a story (textual or self), they situate themselves most 
advantageously for the very perpetuation that defines them.  
As a textual self-model, “One Less” can extend itself through whatever length-of-story-
time best suits the narrative, but when applied to actual self-narrative, the entirety of “One Less” 
serves as an example, perhaps, of a complex metaphor that might last only a few fragmentary 
seconds in a self’s consciousness as it struggles suddenly to deal with a loss-of-control crisis, 
such as the main character’s invaded birthday. Anxiety creates the metaphors, the weird, that will 
(for as long as it needs to be addressed by the self) model the self’s concern with sustaining its 
own narrative. According to Neisser,  
. . . human beings are not concerned only with the present; they also remember the past, 
prepare for the future, and imagine possibilities that may never be realized. I suggest that 
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this extension of consciousness is based on many of the processes that underlie 
perception itself, used in a different and constructive way.27   
 
The main character in “One Less” prepares and imagines as best suits his self-world crisis. The 
extension of his consciousness is the metaphorized weird of his own life, a self-correcting 
projection, perhaps. And as Neisser mentions, the extension of this consciousness is powered by 
the processes underlying perception itself, meaning this extended self may motivate itself to 
notice vastly different aspects of phenomenal space than the main self does. It has, essentially, a 
life of its own, a parallel simulation operated by the same brain that sustains the main self. The 
extended self-world negotiation is the reality of weird taken to its extreme world-building 
conclusions, and, as evidenced by Lundberg’s character’s full immersion in it, it owes nothing to 
negotiating with reality, for it is a negotiation with reality. 
In the end, the main character is even disconnected from the self-culture semiotics of 
language that, as Dennett and others have demonstrated, did much of the initial heavy lifting in 
constructing the self. The main-character-lamp-self can only express “Click,” the language of 
inanimate function. Language fails often enough to categorize crises in a real self; in a story built 
entirely of language, this can be modeled only by metaphor. That very metaphor (when imagistic 
instead of linguistic) in a real self can enter, fragment, and inform the negotiation of self as 
atemporally, as strangely, and as intermittently as needed. 
And Lundberg is not alone in taking affective discharge, experiential space, and 
bilocation as the mechanics of weird. The same devices work to different extrapolated ends in 
Jeffrey Ford’s “Bright Morning,” in M. John Harrison’s “Entertaining Angels Unawares,” and in 
Doug Lain’s “The Word ‘Mermaid’ Written on an Index Card.”28 Einstein’s narrative of self 
takes form, in part, according to atemporal concerns about Lieserl in Karen Joy Fowler’s 
“Lieserl,” and Ted Chiang’s “Hell is the Absence of God” makes physical the concepts of both 
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heaven and hell as imperfect perfected forms that make the afterlife an expression of socio-
occultation—a weird that is too graspable.29 The dithering nature of the self-world negotiation 
appears everywhere in the little weird, and as cultural discourse embraces this more and more, 
narratives become even more dynamically unreal as they come nearer to the true nature of any 
self, which is, ultimately, expression. 
 
Conclusion 
  Of course, one of the primary culprits in the creation of an idio-occult system (of a self) is 
language. When one metaphorizes cognitive occultation in both selves and texts, the result is the 
supernatural—the weird.30 Todorov realizes this in his defining study of fantastic literature: 
If the fantastic constantly makes use of rhetorical figures, it is because it originates in 
them. The supernatural is born of language, it is both its consequence and its proof: not 
only do the devil and vampires exist only in words, but language alone enables us to 
conceive what is always absent: the supernatural. The supernatural thereby becomes a 
symbol of language, just as the figures of rhetoric do, and the figure is, as we have seen, 
the purest form of literality.31  
 
In the same manner that deities might be considered people’s perfected projections of their own 
concerns (perfect in the sense of ultimate, unchanging, and terminally causal), the supernatural 
and the weird can be linguistically perfected projections. They are often their own explanations, 
their own causes—creations based in cultural anxiety, emotion, or interest that share the same 
semiotic mindspace as everyday elements of the real world. And if so much of cognition is 
determined by language and its embedded cultural interests, then language, as Todorov mentions, 
is one of the primary media through which we create our selves (as well as “worlds” and other 
multiplicities of self). Robert Scholes recognized the self-language negotiation as essential to any 
study of speculative fiction in Structural Fabulation: An Essay on Fiction of the Future: “We 
learn that men’s visual perceptions are governed by mental leaps to whole configurations or 
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‘gestalts’ rather than by patient accumulation of phenomenal details. We learn that we acquire 
language in similar quantum jumps of grammatical competence. And we know that our acquired 
languages in turn govern and shape our perceptions of this world.”32 It is important to remember 
that while the supernatural or weird often represents what we think of as non-physical or 
impossible, nothing is non-physical or impossible: everything occurs in materialist space—in this 
case, in the bio-chemical dialogues of mind. Selves are, as many have said, stories, and it is more 
important to recognize that something strange might be informing this story in someone’s 
experiential mindspace (indeed, does inform when we consider the fragmentary, metaphoric, 
revisionist nature of consciousness) than it is to decide that strange or supernatural things “do not 
actually happen” and are therefore estranging features of a narrative.33 Darko Suvin, though he 
regularly maneuvers his theories away from weird fiction in Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 
realizes that “The aliens—utopians, monsters, or simply differing strangers—are a mirror to man 
just as the differing country is a mirror for his world. But the mirror is not only a reflecting one, it 
is also a transforming one, virgin womb and alchemical dynamo: the mirror is a crucible.”34 The 
problem of simply being (with all its concomitant anxieties, projections, threats, and concerns) is 
what estranges characters, narrators, and selves. The strange or the bizarre is part of standard 
consciousness-operation. The culturally agreed-upon mundane is what selves must successfully 
incorporate into their senses of being. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ONE-HANDED CLOCKS:  
 SIMULACRA, RECURSION, AND ANACHRONY 
There’s an alarm clock on the floor beside his bed. The hands and numbers glow green in 
the dark, and he’ll wait five minutes and then he’ll call Susan. Five minutes. Then he’ll 




 Consciousness is not a plotline. It shares many of the same features and operates in many 
of the same ways, but the crucial difference is linear progression: even if a story’s plotline 
unfolds out of time, so to speak, it still does so one word at a time.1 So, if as I have argued, 
narratives of self are nearly identical to textual narratives, does plot become the one difference 
between them? The answer lies in further marrying literary- to cognitive theory. In narratology, a 
fundamental step in understanding “stories” involves first understanding the “fabulas” they 
represent. So it is with consciousness: before we can understand stories of self, we must 
understand the fabulas they create.2  
So, consciousness is indeed not a plotline, but it shapes itself with fragmentary, deep-
structure concerns and anxieties that are rearranged, presented “out of time,” and made 
synchronous with each other. The historical development of cognitive theory has mirrored the 
same in literary theory. So though the two disciplines have only recently begun commingling, 
they have been drawing many of the same conclusions during what has been their unavoidable 
collision course.  
 Ultimately, though, as contemporary culture and senses of self embrace more and more 
the idea of “simulacra,” stories and selves lose more and more of their connection to deep-plots 
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or fabulas as their constructed natures become apparent.3 Stories and selves are becoming, in a 
very real sense, unreal. They are both becoming (have both become) weird. When what selves 
and stories represent is nonexistent in the sense that it could never exist according to its own 
fundamental laws, those selves and stories become simulacra, meaning we are left existing 
impossibly. The little weird models this. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 The negotiation of character-, narrator-, or even reader-consciousness in the little weird 
is, in some ways, a return to earlier poetics. In Consciousness and the Novel: Connected Essays, 
David Lodge elucidates the presentation of narrative self in early English novelists, specifically 
Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding. Defoe, he argues, was the most direct, using a first-person 
“fictitious autobiography or confession.”4 This method, however, has its limits, as Lodge 
realizes: “This simple equation between first-person consciousness and first-person narration 
works—up to a point.”5 Defoe’s model is largely linear: narrative self appears as the end result, 
the final say of a being process. These stories do not model a consciousness, not as we envision 
such today—they report one, resulting in a significant gap between the operations of narrative 
and the operations of self. They are focused, then, on how we understand (or, at least, 
understood) selves but not truly on what a self is and how that informs its relation to other 
narratives. Gilbert Ryle’s ghost in the machine still dwells happily in the pages of Defoe’s texts, 
in that the negotiated “plotline” or linearity of a self performs as the self, tacitly ignoring that this 
is, in fact, the product of a self. 
Samuel Richardson, Lodge continues, evolved literary representation of consciousness 
with the use of the epistolary novel. “When a story is told through letters,” Lodge argues, “the 
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first-person phenomenon of experience is reported in a first-person narrative while it is still 
fresh. The narrative unfolds with the events, and the outcome is unknown to the narrators.”6 
Richardson’s model does away with the presentation of selves as entirely linear, bestowing that 
property instead on the external phenomena to which selves react. By revealing narrative through 
a series of letters, the produce of selves is presented as exactly that—the business of a self as a 
non-linear narrative-producer and not as final narrative remains absent. As Lodge realizes, “This 
overcomes the problem raised by the pseudo-autobiographical novel about reconciling the time 
frame of its putative composition with the time frame of the action.”7 Essentially, the impossible 
match-up of story and fabula disappears. Admittedly, Richardson did not move consciousness-
understanding closer to an appreciation of its true fragmentary, metaphoric, and weird nature, but 
neither did he move us further away from it. It is not until the discovery of “free indirect style” 
Lodge states, that third-person realism would combine with and stabilize the first-person 
narration of literary selves.8  
Jane Austen freely employed free indirect discourse, which stamps character-thought 
directly into a text without any explanatory tags, narratorial intrusion, or other barriers between 
the character-self and its reader. In Emma, for example, “the story is told almost entirely from 
[Emma’s] point of view.”9 While this, at first, does not seem entirely a deviation from earlier 
pseudo-autobiographical models, it differs in its use of free-indirect discourse, which more 
clearly presents the story as a negotiation between Emma’s sense of self and the socio-cultural 
discourse occurring constantly around her. Lodge explains that “during most of the action, she is 
mistaken about the true state of affairs, so that, on the first reading, the reader shares at least 
some of her misapprehensions, and the shock of discovery.”10 These misapprehensions of 
Emma’s self-world negotiation are the early epistemological gaps into which writers of the little 
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weird will later drive their strange devices.  
Victorian novelists also expanded this new model by telling their stories through “several 
points of view, which are often mediated through free indirect style, but compared and assessed 
by an authorial narrator.”11 The “implied author” focalizing these collections of viewpoint 
characters and their narrators presents multiple negotiations of selves as the superstructures of its 
overarching stories. Further, “This was thoroughly consistent with the Victorian novelist’s aim to 
present the individual in relation to society and social change.”12 As a result, this implied author 
then anticipates Neisser’s ecological and extended selves in Lutz’s self-culture discourse. In the 
little weird, this phenomenon would ultimately take the form of bilocation or multiplicity-of-self, 
demonstrating my previous conclusion that everything is a projection of self—is the self.  
Following the turn of the twentieth century, modernist writers like Virginia Woolf and 
James Joyce collated these many stages of literary consciousness into narratives that attempted to 
portray the actual negotiations of self instead of simply reporting the general phenomena of 
conscious being. Their stream-of-consciousness mode introduced the fragmentary, metaphoric 
nature of thought and revealed explicitly the many discourses in process at any given time 
between a self and its environment. They focused less on behavior and more on an early literary 
psychology. In the mid- to late-twentieth century, the advent of postmodernism would reveal that 
the great hindrance in the stream-of-consciousness mode was its inescapable linearity of 
presentation. No matter how authors diverted the streams of their characters’ consciousnesses, 
readers could only track them one at a time. In the hands of writers like Kurt Vonnegut, Jorge 
Luis Borges, and Philip K. Dick, narrative presentation returned to earlier models, using both 
first- and third-person narration and clearer delineations between character and narrator thought, 
speech, action, and description. These writers realized the impossible finality of stream-of-
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consciousness to portray the negotiations of selves. Indeed, they elevated the impossibility of 
textually representing consciousness as the method by which to destabilize once and for all the 
idea of real linearity in both selves and stories. In “Postmodernism and Science Fiction,” Andrew 
M. Butler’s observations about Fredric Jameson’s postmodern realizations close some of the 
final gaps between narrative and cognitive selves: 
For Jameson a postmodern text is not a critical representation of an authentic reality, but 
is a simulacrum, a copy without an original. . . . The work is ironically performing, rather 
than sincerely expressing, emotions or feelings of the artist—not that there is a stable 
identity which is the artist’s self-identity any more, as she or he pastiches the styles of 
others. What results is schizophrenic écriture, where there is a breakdown in the 
meaningful connections between the words or images; at its most basic this may be an 
eclectic range of allusions, but it could be a bewildering collection of fragments of 
different voices. Finally, there is the sense of the sublime in the postmodern text, in part 
in its exhilarating, hysterical disorientation.13 
 
It is around the time of Jameson’s realizations that many theories of narratology took solid hold, 
meaning that the negotiation of selves (even if critical understanding of the process had yet more 
steps to take) had finally begun aligning with the impossible semiotic nature of postmodern 
literature. What Butler calls Jameson’s “breakdown in the meaningful connections between the 
words or images” is, essentially, the first realization of what I referred to earlier as existing 
impossibly. Selves and stories had finally begun to mean only their own operations, and the idea 
of true mimesis became simply another cultural discourse—itself as impossible as the fabulas 
that both literary- and cognitive-narratives could no longer represent.14 Indeed, postmodern 
writers realized that these representations had, in fact, never existed at all, and it would fall to 
writers of the little weird to demonstrate this explicitly. 
 
Analysis 
 The finalizing division between narratives and selves indeed must come to linearity. The 
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postmodern authors I mentioned above (and the weird writers who followed them) realized this 
irreconcilable difference and metafictionally turned it on its head—if their stories could not 
overcome the division, they could see that its readings did. Writers of little weird fiction take the 
maneuver thoroughly one step further by first destabilizing story-fabula connections generally 
before weirding story-time specifically. 
 For one of the clearest demonstrations of the story-fabula disconnect, I must return to one 
of my earlier examples: Kelly Link’s “Lull.”15 In the story, one finds what (at first glance) look 
like frame stories. To oversimplify, a group of friends have gathered to amuse themselves with 
card games. During the course of their evening, one proposes calling a phone-sex hotline—only 
this hotline also offers the clandestine services of a storyteller named Starlight. The friends 
present everything they would like to hear in their story, and Starlight complies, shifting the 
narrative seemingly into a frame story. However, by the end of Starlight’s narrative (which Link 
presents not in told-story fashion but in the same narrative mode as the main story), one of the 
characters, the Cheerleader, begins telling her own story to another character, the Devil. Only, as 
she begins what would be a deeper-level frame story, she reveals that her tale is about Ed, one of 
the friends who gathered to play cards. The next segment of “Lull” shifts into the Cheerleader’s 
story—again, not as a told-story, but in the same narrative mode as the other two frame stories. 
We learn right away that “The man’s name is Ed. It isn’t his real name. I made it up” (71). The 
Cheerleader’s story has begun telling the story of the friends who gathered and called Starlight. 
The frame stories are no longer framed—each shares the same narrative priority as the others. 
Each ends by creating the next, which in turn creates those behind it. Eventually, even “Ed” tells 
a story of his own. As such, the various stories in “Lull” lack any fabula, for none of them can 
exist under their own fundamental laws. 
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 If the fabula, then, is the collection of “real-world” events that a story invokes, “Lull” 
lacks one. In a simple tale about, say, a farmer going to market, readers can back-form the fabula 
out of the details in the story: which events happened in which order, what was sold to whom, 
how the stalls and street-vendors appeared. However, to try to do so to “Lull” (its atemporal 
complexity aside) is impossible. One might successfully back-form the fabula behind the initial 
story about the card-playing friends; however, as soon as one tries to tie the nested, subject-
object confusion of the several stories in “Lull” to real-world phenomena, one must reconcile 
multiple realities with the literal construction of others.16 While this is impossible in the 
phenomenal world, it is in the very nature of cognitive narrative. If Baudrillard’s simulacra 
“feign to have what [they] don’t have,” then the recursive nature of the stories in “Lull” fit the 
bill: they do not have a fabula, they do not even have stable forms of narrator versus narrated.17 
Consciousness, however, has: it constantly narrates itself as part of Lutz’s self-culture discourse. 
Further, its artifacts (for example, literature) narrate the self-culture discourse themselves. 
Meaningful recursion like this is the motive force behind all the ongoing negotiations that create 
selves, particularly Dennett’s dispositional states and Dawkins’s memes. These cognitive 
phenomena “voice” themselves into the ongoing revision of “self” (including Neisser’s 
ecological and extended selves) and then adjust accordingly to best sustain the new, negotiated 
self. They narrate and are narrated, as Baudrillard explains: 
. . . we are in a logic of simulation, which no longer has anything to do with a logic of 
facts and an order of reason. Simulation is characterized by a precession of the model, of 
all the models based on the merest fact. . . . The facts no longer have a specific trajectory, 
they are born at the intersection of models, a single fact can be engendered by all the 
models at once. This anticipation, this precession, this short circuit, this confusion of the 
fact with its model (no more divergence of meaning, no more dialectical polarity, no 
more negative electricity, implosion of antagonistic poles) is what allows each time for 
all possible interpretations, even the most contradictory—all true, in the sense that their 
truth is to be exchanged, in the image of the models from which they derive, in a 
generalized cycle.”18  
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Further, David Bohm points out that “it is important to note that facts are not to be considered as 
if they were independently existent objects that we might find or pick up in the laboratory.”19 
When Baudrillard says that we are no longer involved in “a logic of facts,” he is correct in more 
regards than, perhaps, he intended. Bohm goes on to explain that we make facts: “. . . beginning 
with immediate perception of an actual situation, we develop the fact by giving it further order, 
form and structure with the aid of our theoretical concepts.”20 The little weird, then, and “Lull” 
in particular, follows the example of early postmodern voices and lifts the impossibility of facts 
and fabulas into full, problematic view. Being impossibly wants impossible literature. When this 
paradox is metaphorized, it mimics the operation of consciousness (as best it can) and 
unavoidably creates the weird, resulting in Butler’s “schizophrenic écriture” with its “breakdown 
in the meaningful connections” between words and images.21 If there is no connection between 
the words and images (the story-fabula disconnect), then Butler’s breakdown becomes the only 
artistic mode for expressing how strange the normal really is. Normal is the new weird, and it 
collapses upon itself (as in “Lull”) when it invades the atemporal, metaphoric, and fragmentary 
negotiation of a self. 
 
Further Analysis 
Literary simulacra pair themselves often with recursion, for it is the nature of a copy 
without an original to create loops of Saussure’s “signification.” This pairing in the little weird, 
as part of its “being impossibly,” metaphorizes, in its unavoidably linear way, the atemporality of 
consciousness. Recursive simulacra create sinkholes of meaning, in that they signify what cannot 
fundamentally exist. 
In one of the story worlds that appears in “Lull,” before the card-playing friends even call 
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Starlight, the matter of the strange orchard house appears in the narrative. This house will later 
play a significant, self-world role in the story of “Ed,” but at first, it appears simply as an 
inexplicable anomaly, a metaphor, perhaps, of the irreconcilable nature of normal that each of 
the friends struggles with. Ed tells us in the first story that “‘Off the highway, down by that 
Texaco, in the orchards. This guy built a road and built a house right on top of the road. Just, 
plop, right in the middle of the road. Kind of like he came walking up the road with the house on 
his back, got tired, and just dropped it’” (55). No one involved in the story-locale’s cultural 
discourse knows the explanation behind the strange house.22 Even if “Lull” did point to a fabula, 
any person who could explain the mystery of the orchard house would be beyond it, for he or she 
is not included in the “story”: “Ed says, “Where the house is, is the first weird thing. The second 
thing is the house. It’s like this team of architects went crazy and sawed two different houses in 
half and then stitched them back together. Casa Del Guggenstein. The front half is really old—a 
hundred years old—the other half is aluminum siding’” (55, italics mine). As such, the 
characters are left only with constantly anchorless theories perpetuated by their own and by the 
locale’s cultural discourse to explain the anomaly—the house becomes a meaning vacuum, for it 
will always be, as the story explains, beyond understanding: “Which was the plan because this 
guy who built it was a real hermit, a recluse. People in town said all kinds of stuff about him. 
Nobody knew. He didn’t want anybody to know” (57). The house undergoes the same extended-
self revision that generates “real” selves, which, of course, inform how we negotiate meaning 
from Link’s characters.  The house’s unstable nature invites any number of constant and variable 
projections of self-anxiety onto the house—it can become one of Neisser’s extended selves, an 
acting place powered by what the characters put upon it. Without a fabula, with only realities of 
nullity to point to, semiotic sinkholes like the house metaphorize the real-world disconnect 
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between narratives of self and any explanatory fabula of self. 
A similar sinkhole appears in Jeffrey Ford’s “The Yellow Chamber.” In the story’s 
“Center for the Reification of Actual Probability,” the mechanico-organic Melusina is the reified 
collaboration of three people: two brilliant researchers in probability, mathematics, and 
philosophy, and a charlatan scholar. The Melusina resulted from the trio whispering orders to 
unseen technicians for the construction of their collaborative reification—except, none of the trio 
speaks to the other about the Melusina during her/its multi-year construction. The Melusina 
draws its power from biological chemical reactions, yet it is given form by a metal case 
(including a female head). It thinks with a genuine human brain. The Melusina’s raison d'être  
. . . what with its quantum ability to traffic in probabilities, was to describe the existence 
of, and goings on in, a particular alternate reality. The location commented upon by the 
device was a wandering island it called Threbansch. This errant landmass drifted upon 
the yellow sea of another world that did not necessarily exist but very well could have. 
(235)23 
 
While, at first glance, this seems merely a farce of the researchers’ unspoken whims slowly 
building on and informing each other, the Melusina’s ties to Threbansch become problematic 
later—they become world-buildingly recursive. Pelasio DeGris, the ruler of Threbansch, has 
spent many “years” haunted by a phantom.24 Mercy Bond (one of the researchers) “comments” 
upon the haunting while the Melusina recursively both receives and sends Bond’s flights of 
imagination:  
[Bond] watched as the insubstantial phantom strode the ramparts [in Threbansch] in his 
powder blue pajamas like some prodigious exhalation of pipe smoke, mourning its 
execution many years earlier. His crime had been to suggest that the island be anchored. 
He had roused the populace to believe that they could never be actual without a definite 
location, and that their incessant wandering trapped them in a state of unreality. . . . (238) 
 
Threbansch, then, is seeking its own fabula, for it cannot in any phenomenal world (its own 
missing one or the alternate reality of the Center that, at this point in the story, creates 
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Threbansch) be without one. Like the narrator-narrated nature of the stories in “Lull,” 
Threbansch is being impossibly. Later, when the narrative exposes the infinitely recursive 
creator-created relationship between the Center and Threbansch (especially when the roles are 
first reversed), this exposure works backward through the story, altering Threbansch from a 
flight of collective fancy to a place of its own that creates the Center in its struggle to be actual. 
The only recoverable fabula in the story, that of the Center, evaporates. The self-world 
negotiation, Neisser’s extended selves, and Bal’s “acting place” find their metaphorization, their 
narrative expression in the recursion between Threbansch and Center. “The Yellow Chamber,” 
as with many other stories of the little weird, celebrates the impossible nature of expressing self 
and consciousness through the inescapably linear nature of text. The weird here works just 
fine—as I have demonstrated previously, it is a characterization of consciousness itself; however, 
the normal cannot reconcile itself with the disconnect between itself (the real world as our 
narratives commonly tell us) and the “experiential space” of consciousness. It is this inescapable 
disconnect that the story-fabula disconnect expresses.25 
 
Final Analysis 
 Recursion or atemporality in the Little Weird is yet another similarity between textual 
narratives and narratives of self. “Anachrony” as Mieke Bal calls the phenomenon is not 
anything new. She explains that “Differences between the arrangement in the story and the 
chronology of the fabula we call chronological deviations or anachronies.”26 These are the 
movements forward or backward in “time” that a story makes in its process of prioritizing or 
focalizing elements of its fabula. It allows a narrator, essentially, to revise its narrative as it goes, 
suddenly re-informing everything that has already occurred in the narrative with an insight from 
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the past or, similarly, readying a reader semantically so that he or she focalizes the remainder of 
the unavoidably linear story appropriately.  
 Selves do the same thing in their processes of negotiation. Ernest Keen’s observations in 
“Being Conscious is Being-in-the-World” demonstrate that 
A duration of present experience is a structured now, containing within its structure pasts 
as remembered and futures as anticipated, and enacting through its structure those acts of 
appropriation. Nothing could be more complex. Temporality, as it presents itself to us in 
consciousness, when that consciousness is taken as a phenomenon, an appearance and a 
presence rather than a function, freely violates the rules of Newtonian temporality. I 
change the past in remembering it. Its role in my life, its causal efficacy, if you will, is 
utterly unchangeable by my reinterpreting it—again, a backwards influence in which the 
later present acts backward on an earlier past, changing the past’s acting forward on the 
later present and future. Consciousness times itself in its own way, a way unlike that 
conceived in physics and extended to the analysis of functional relations between 
organisms and their environment.27 
 
Consciousness, of course, makes ready use of our pasts and futures in aligning its narrative with 
its determining dispositions, anxieties, and concerns at any given time. Further, literature often 
does the same itself: modernist writers like Woolf and Joyce working with stream-of-
consciousness demonstrated this keenly. Though they may be linear, narratives are not temporal, 
for they are both created and received in the anti-Newtonian realms of experiential space. As 
Bohm points out, “Protagoras said: ‘Man is the measure of all things’, thus emphasizing that 
measure is not a reality external to man, existing independently of him.”28 Bohm uses this idea in 
support of his overarching thesis about the problems of fragmentation or categorization, but the 
truism serves just as well in the study of narrative. Events must be timed so that they we might 
properly focalize them as best suits narrative need, cognitive or textual. After all, as Baudrillard 
says, “Our entire linear and accumulative culture collapses if we cannot stockpile the past in 
plain view.”29 
 My point is not to argue that real-world events have not happened in the past, nor that 
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nothing will ever occur in the future. But any real nature of past and future is beyond both 
cognitive and narrative reach. As soon as a self focalizes the perceived phenomena of the outside 
world into the worlds it builds in its experiential space, the data undergoes immediate and 
unending revision.30 There are no real fabula for the narratives of consciousness to point to, for 
selves create fabula simultaneously with their stories as they go about perceiving. As Bal points 
out, there are inevitable disconnects in relations between story and fabula: “When a certain part 
of the time covered by the fabula is given absolutely no attention at all, the amount of TF (time 
of the fabula) is infinitely much larger than the TS (story-time). On the other hand, we can 
distinguish the pause, when an element that takes no fabula-time (so an object, not a process) is 
presented in detail.”31 Bal’s observations delineate the impossibility of “isochrony” between 
stories and fabulas. The phenomenal world is its own fabula in that there is no overarching 
narrative attempting to represent all of it. However, selves and stories, with their limited 
perceptual capability, their constantly interrupting anachronies, and their focalizations cannot 
possibly reconcile themselves with all of phenomenal space-time. Hence the necessity for causal 
occultation; hence the need for sustaining a self model for those few aspects of phenomenal 
space that interact with the self. Those aspects, in many ways, inform the anxieties and 
dispositions that determine how the self will model its interaction with the outside world. 
 What selves are left with in this morass of created time, is an enduring present. Keen 
points out that  
The future, then, is present; it is not merely a point yet to be traversed. Even more 
vividly, the present is not a specious point forever caught between a constantly receding 
past and a constantly approaching future. Rather the present is a duration. Experience 
endures, and its relation to both future and the past is one of appropriation. I appropriate 
the future and the past, in anticipations and in memories, and through these 
appropriations I weave together a now that has a complexity and density vastly unlike 
that empty point on a Newtonian time line.32 
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Selves endure through revision: the five-year-old self does not exist within a twenty-year-old self 
except as it has been revised along the way. These processes, of course, inform how we 
understand literary selves. Narration is dynamic: it relates the interaction of constantly revising 
selves, of enduring presents, of memetic transmission. Story is, then, a collision of anachronistic 
negotiations, revisions, and anticipations, irreversibly separated from fabula, for where is the 
real, the fabula, to be found? And even when one finds one, once a self introduces the fabula-
information to its negotiation, it becomes only story. As Baudrillard demonstrates, the real is “no 
longer anything but operational. In fact, it is no longer really the real, because no imaginary 
envelops it anymore. It is a hyperreal produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory models 
in a hyperspace without atmosphere.”33 The “operational real” is the storied negotiation of 
phenomena from out there within the anti-Newtonian, atemporal, fragmentary, and metaphoric 
realm of experiential space. 
 Of course, there remains the problem of literary linearity-of-presentation. Things do not 
occur one-at-a-time in consciousness as they do in literature. But, just as an anachrony in a story 
can revise what one has read prior (or inform what one will read), so can the story, in its entirety, 
can be an anachrony. As with recursion and simulacra, the Little Weird fascinates itself with the 
impossibility of temporality and therefore metaphorizes the entire problem. In “Lull,” this occurs 
within the orchard house. At the story’s conclusion, in the midst of the house’s many semiotic 
sinkholes, Ed experiences a suspense in time: “There’s an alarm clock on the floor beside his 
bed. The hands and numbers glow green in the dark, and he’ll wait five minutes and then he’ll 
call Susan. Five minutes. Then he’ll call her back. The hands aren’t moving, but he can wait” 
(83). The text offers no mention of time stopping, meaning the question of when it did is as 
semiotically open as the house. The story’s recursive narrator-narrated format, the anachronies 
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that appear, the creation of acting places—all of these elements have been revised as suspended 
in time. They all occur, under these contexts, at the same time. Though we experience the story’s 
many elements linearly, the suspension of time at the end works backward through the entire 
text. Everything that has appeared previously becomes co-equal and co-eval in Keen’s “enduring 
present,” thereby modeling more closely than even modernist stream-of-consciousness did the 
process of cognitive narrative. Keen demonstrates the parallel between cognitive and narrative 
revision: 
But this time frame, this notion of temporality, is already inadequate as soon as we move 
from (1) the mechanical relations of past cause to future effect to (2) the human knowing 
of these relations. Our knowing of these relations is a prediction, an anticipation of the 
future. The future, as anticipation, as experience, rather than as merely some later point 
on a simple time line, is a presence in my life. The future is present. I anticipate now. My 
now is aimed at a present future, which affects my decisions in a way wholly unlike the 
mechanical relations in Newtonian time. My future shapes my present, a backwards 
influence to which we commonly give the name teleology.34  
 
By casting the entire story (because of the recursive, inter-linked nature of each frame story’s 
reality informing the others) in a suspended instant, Link has effectively dodged the problem of 
linearity. Though one might take the time-suspense simply as another metaphor of, perhaps, 
alienation or isolation, if Ed’s moment never ends, then neither can any of the other moments in 
the story. 
 A similar occurrence takes place in “The Yellow Chamber.” In the story’s conclusion, it 
becomes clear that the Melusina is also Ocinda the witch from Threbansch. Ocinda’s non-actual 
reality, through various means, created the reality of the Center, our reality, one might argue. In 
turn, the Center’s reality also had already created Threbansch. Further, the two recursive realities 
are, in true form, the black serpent that swims Threbansch’s seas. In the end, “It swam 
relentlessly for a day, a century, forever, and in that brief span all things were probable” (241). 
The two realities, in the form of the serpent, become co-equal, and they “swim relentlessly” in a 
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non-space between them both, that non-space now occupying the position of the real. They exist 
physically in a space beyond our physics, a space that we cannot for certain say involves our 
time. Though it may involve time, it also interpretively must not (as Dennett shows with his 
demonstration of what cannot exist in the world of Sherlock Holmes). The events in “The 
Yellow Chamber,” through the story’s conclusion, become un-timed. Ford, then, dodges linearity 
differently than Link, but no less effectively. Doug Lain accomplishes a similar feat in “The ‘84 
Regress” when the narrator explains “The year 1984 never ended” (3).35 Alex Irvine does no less 
in “Gus Dream of Biting the Mailman”: the final, brief segment in the story begins with “What it 
all boils down to is this, this one end that is eternally present” (70).36 And these are but a few 
examples of the maneuver. The little weird offers many more within its bounds, and true to its 
liminal-genre nature, even a few beyond. 
 
Conclusion 
 Literature, of course, has no inherent responsibility to represent consciousness. However, 
it is in its nature to tend to do so, as David Lodge’s brief historical sketch demonstrates. As I said 
previously, art is nothing if not a record of our abstractions. Over time, how we conceive 
ourselves and the literature that explores this cannot help but collide. The boom in electronic 
publication, correspondence, and internet blogging leads every day to exponentially more and 
more discourse about the nature of expression and how best to fit it into cultural negotiation. 
Literary criticism and literary theory, as I stated in the introduction, no longer belong solely to 
Academe; further, the blurring of the lines between high art and low and a growing distaste for 
genre classification has only increased the merge between theoretical debate and everyday 
conversation. In the dynamically involute, blogosphere-informed textual communities of today, 
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theory that cannot hold its own weight disappears rapidly. But a general trend in form and 
execution like the little weird, with its roots in a centuries-old tradition of weird, of speculation, 
and of romance will inevitably find ways to converse with science. In Yevgeny Zamytin’s We, 
characters walk unaided on the wings of a spacecraft; in Alfred Bester’s The Demolished Man, 
trends in cognitive evolution lead to postmodern  psi-conflicts; and in works like “Lull,” “The 
Yellow Chamber,” and the others I have mentioned, time takes its proper role as a cognitive 
metaphor, as what Protagorus referred to as the internal measure. The telling of stories becomes 
the unified field, not who tells them, and certainly not to whom they are told. We are our stories; 
we are our metaphors and anachronies and creator-created recursions—and nothing gets to us 
except through them. Even though cognitive science has not yet unlocked all of the black boxes 
of the brain, the intersection of cognition and narrative that appears in the little weird has at least 
begun modeling these remaining mysteries with, perhaps, a brief, backward glance at the 
surrealist tradition. After all, as Dennett points out “of all the things in the environment an active 
body must make mental models of, none is more crucial than the model an agent has of itself.”37  
 
Notes to Chapter 4 
 
1 Roland Barthes demonstrates in S/Z that readers do not necessarily unpack meaning one 
word at a time, per se; rather, “Although every unit we mention here will be a signifier, this one 
is of a very special type: it is the signifier par excellence because of its connotation. . . . We shall 
call this element a signifier . . . or a seme (semantically, the seme is the unit of the signifier.” 
Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans., Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 17 (italics 
original). Barthes here refers to Saussure’s seminal theory of semiology involving linguistic 




at a time, a paragraph at a time, or even a morpheme at a time. The point here is that they do 
each of these processes one at a time. 
2 Mieke Bal defines the fabula as “a series of logically and chronologically related events 
that are caused or experienced by actors.” Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of 
Narrative (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1985), 5. A “fabula” then is the collection of events, actors, 
and experiences that a “story” represents. Whereas stories may involve such devices as gaps in 
the timeline, flashbacks, and even the excision of unimportant details, fabulas contain all of these 
things. They are, essentially, the phenomena that are storied. In the frontmatter to Narratology, 
Bal clarifies this differentiation with a “distinction between the text (the linguistic structure and 
the different speakers involved), the story (the arrangement of the content in a specific manner), 
and the fabula (the structure of the fictitious or ‘real’ content).” 
3 In Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard says “Simulation is no longer that of a 
territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without 
origin or reality: a hyperreal.” Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans., Sheila Faria 
Glaser (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994), 1. Andrew M. Butler clarifies the idea in 
“Postmodernism and Science Fiction”: “Baudrillard’s theory of the simulacrum is that the history 
of images means that the copy is becoming more desirable. Images are tied in with notions of 
exchange—one image is exchanged for an idea—and in, say, the history of economics it has 
become better to exchange goods for money rather than objects. In the postworld war the image 
has become everything, especially the copy that has no original; the model has replaced the 
actual, the opinion poll has become more important than the election. Everyday life has become 




For Baudrillard such lack of reality has infected the very landscape of America itself, although 
this infection has been obscured from its inhabitants.” Andrew M. Butler, “Postmodernism and 
Science Fiction,” The Cambridge Companion to Science Fiction, eds., Edward James and Farah 
Mendlesohn (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003),  144. 
4 David Lodge, “Consciousness and the Novel,” in Consciousness and the Novel: 




8 Ibid., 45. 
9 Ibid., 48. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 49. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Andrew M. Butler, “Postmodernism and Science Fiction,” The Cambridge Companion 
to Science Fiction (see note 3), 141. 
14 Maggie Ann Bowers points out that the esteemed Italo Calvino “himself states, his 
stories, like those of Borges, do not rely on a recognizable version of reality to support their 
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 It is, perhaps, counter-intuitive to offer an explanation of a literary phenomenon at the 
conclusion of its study. However, by their nature, the stories I have placed under the lens of the 
little weird (as well as those I have suggested only by implication) are interstitial. They blur 
common genre and common type and become instead part of an anti-genre—a catchall for 
windfall oddities. As such, the little weird bears an examination of function, not classification. 
By presenting the cognitive performance of these stories before addressing what they are, I hope 
to have emphasized what many cross-genre writers themselves take as a priority: narrative 
movement and creative flux. Under which categories they might be grouped is only of incidental 
significance. Indeed, since many speculative fiction sub-genres earn their lineaments in 
publishers’ marketing efforts, the little weird’s foundation in the small press exempts this 
literature from many of these same efforts. Small press publications sell themselves often in a 
kind of opposition to the produce of larger publishing houses. The small press is itself an entire, 
interstitial movement, surviving in the gaps between larger, often more commercial publishing 
endeavors. As I mentioned in my introduction, Brian Attebery was correct when he said that 
most innovation in speculative fiction today occurs in periodicals.1 But to reiterate my extension 
of his idea, it is within the small press that the most dynamic of this innovation occurs. 
 But innovation is in many ways similar to Baudrillard’s “simulacral precession.” It 
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models ab nihilo what is to be the new real, the new Speculative Fiction. As such, exposing the 
cognitive narrativity in the little weird is not enough, for nothing exists in a vacuum. To depart 
with a full understanding of the impact of the phenomenon, it must be placed (as best, by its 
unstable nature, it can) in the growth cycle of the speculative tradition. 
 
Analysis 
 The little weird is decidedly not a divergence into one, specific speculative tradition. For 
example, it is not a wholesale shift into magical realism. Though there are a number of 
similarities between the two literary phenomena, magical realism favors the impossible 
simultaneity of a positivist reality as well as a magical one.2 Neither is technically privileged 
over the other; however, equating the two is a de facto privileging of the magic, for it is often 
irreconcilable with positivism. To make it reconcilable is inherently not positivism. The little 
weird, as I have attempted to show, demonstrates the weird (or magic) as a product of positivism 
(it is the result of materialist cognition, specifically metaphorization, idio-occultation, and 
atemporality). Magic and real, then, are co-equal, for they are both the results of self-world 
negotiation; however, neither occur out there in the world, as is often the conceit in purist 
magical realism. In other words, in the little weird, the magic is not real, nor is the real magic. 
The two do not compete; the magic does not deconstruct the real, for they are both narratives 
generated by motivated perception, focalization, and affective discharge. In this sense, the non-
genre little weird is a way of seeing literature, but it does not follow in the wake of any manifesto 
or teleology—it is a point of discourse between a self and a work of literature informed by the 
collision of cognitive- and literary theories. Further, as I have demonstrated, in the little weird, it 
is the normal, the mundane, and the real that is ungraspable, not the magic. That magical realism 
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reconciles the magic with the real is, as I have said, inherently calling attention to the need-to-
reconcile. This implies the generally ungraspable nature of the magic. Rather, in the little weird, 
the real must reconcile with the weird (i.e. magic), therefore operating from the assumption that 
the real is already-weird. Under these circumstances, magical realist reconciliation becomes 
tautological.  
Further, magical realism has often been a mode of protest against hegemony. Maggie 
Ann Bowers explains that “Magical realism has become a popular narrative mode because it 
offers to the writer wishing to write against totalitarian regimes a means to attack the definitions 
and assumptions which support such systems (e.g. colonialism) by attacking the stability of the 
definitions upon which these systems rely.”3 Work in the little weird, while certainly sometimes 
following this example, often expresses what becomes the unknowable or irreconcilable-with-
self aspects of being mired within totalitarian regimes (e.g. Western commercialism) instead of 
being decidedly othered by them. While “Magic(al) realist writing . . . has become associated 
with the modernist techniques of the disruption of linear narrative time and the questioning of the 
notion of history,”4 meaning that magical realism shares with the little weird a number of the 
techniques I examined in “One-handed Clocks,” it “is often criticized for relying on a European 
viewpoint that assumes that magic and the irrational belong to indigenous and non-European 
cultures, whereas rationality and a true sense of reality belong to a European perspective.”5 
Taking “European” in this sense to mean technologically, financially, and legally sophisticated 
society in general, this magical realist view is a reverse-totality, a damaging generalization of 
what is abstracted to represent what is not-indigenous and European. The little weird, departing 
often, as I said, from within totalitarian regimes, deconstructs or destabilizes this reversed 
totality. A totalitarian regime is not a unified front, and like any cultural discourse, its 
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occultations leave epistemological gaps that the citizens “perpetuating” it must reconcile with 
themselves and with larger, global discourses.6 
 The little weird is also not necessarily the next incarnation of either science fiction or 
fantasy, although some of its works certainly share enough tropes with both of these categories 
to, by themselves, qualify. Bowers points out that magical realism is not science fiction because 
“The science fiction narrative’s distinct difference from magical realism is that it is set in a world 
different from any known reality and its realism resides in the fact that we can recognize it as a 
possibility for our future. Unlike magical realism, it does not have a realistic setting that is 
recognizable in relation to any past or present reality.”7 The little weird shares this same 
difference from science fiction; however, Bowers’s observation is only a first step in noting 
categories of speculative divergence from the oft-blanketedly applied “science fiction.”8 Further, 
her classification of what is science fiction has become unsteady. Science fiction need no longer 
occupy worlds different from any known reality; indeed, many of its works have turned away 
from the frontiers of space or alien worlds to look instead at Earth. Even the “distance” between 
the present and the future once associated with science fiction has narrowed. Science fiction may 
take place only a short time from the present, it may occupy the present itself, or it may write 
itself into the past. And if science fiction is, as Bowers suggests, simply “recognition of future 
possibility” painted onto alien worlds, then it neglects its role in Ernest Keen’s idea of the future 
as a structured now here in the familiar and the domestic.9 Robert Scholes espouses that “[O]ur 
need for future feedback to guide present action makes writers of fiction responsible for the 
production of imaginative models of the future, alternative projections that can give us some 
sense of the consequences of present actions,” but he does not restrict his models to the alien.10 
Further, the seminal science fiction theorist Darko Suvin points out that “. . . the cognitive value 
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of all SF, including anticipation-tales, is to be found in its analogical reference to the author’s 
present rather than in predictions, discrete or global. Science-fictional cognition is based on an 
aesthetic hypothesis akin to the proceedings of satire or pastoral rather than those of futurology 
or political programs.”11 However, even Suvin’s definitions of science fiction have become 
problematic. 
 The little weird then is part of a general collision of categories, labels, and genres—it is 
not the next evolutionary step of any of them. For example, Suvin’s seminal Metamorphoses of 
Science Fiction makes little room for the “weird.” His adaptation of Ernst Bloch’s “novum” and 
his use of the Russian Formalists’ “estrangement” pushed understandings of science fiction in 
quantifiable directions.12 However, clean Suvinian science fiction no longer necessarily 
dominates the genre. In delineating his science fiction, Suvin claims that “A further step down 
into pseudo-sophistication—correlative, no doubt, to a marked decadence of cultural taste in 
bourgeois society and its literary markets—is the parasitism of Gothic, horror, and weird fantasy 
upon SF. Such fantasy is characterized, as I have said, by the irruption of an anti-cognitive world 
into the world of empirical cognition.”13 Csicsery-Ronay points out that “Suvin argued that an sf 
text presents aspects of a reader’s empirical reality ‘made strange’ through a new perspective 
‘implying a new set of norms’. This recasting of the familiar has a ‘cognitive’ purpose, that is, 
the recognition of reality it evokes from the reader is a gain in rational understanding the social 
conditions of existence.”14 For Suvin, cognitive meant normalizing in terms of Catherine Lutz’s 
self-culture discourse. As a result, Suvin’s ideas of weird not fulfilling the same cognitive role as 
science fiction mirrors magical realism’s failure to account for cognition and weird both as 
products, as narratives produced by brains. Suvin’s cognitive normality must be (as the collision 
of cognitive- and literary-theory in the little weird demonstrates) a process generated by what I 
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have argued is the inherently weird nature of selves being. Suvin’s cognitive normalization only 
perpetuates a number of the myths of self that I have attempted to deconstruct. Weird is not anti-
cognitive; nor is it parasitic. Indeed, under Suvin’s use of the term, weird is pre-cognitive: it is 
part of the processes responsible for generating his normative cognition. A parasite, we might 
say, requires a host, and such is not the case here. That science fiction as Suvin defined it gave 
voice to future-as-present models that explicitly expressed only extrapolated positivism only 
means that it was awaiting (or anticipating) advances in positivist discovery and how we will 
reconcile them as part of our culturally normative cognition. Dennett, Baars, Bohm, and the 
many others I have here relied upon for their theories of self have provided exactly those 
discoveries, and the little weird has taken up Suvin’s science-fictional task of extrapolating a 
future for the present in regards to how we understand ourselves and our stories. Csicsery-Ronay 
realizes this when he points out that Carl Freedman in Critical Theory and Science Fiction  “. . . 
suggests that Suvin’s category can be made valid by thinking of sf not in terms of real cognition,  
but as a ‘cognition effect’—a rhetorical construction that evokes the sense of true cognition.”15 
My essential argument is that the little weird performs exactly this evocation. It is, then, part of 
the contemporary genre-collision that now defines the majority of what once may have been 
clean genres, but it is not any phoenix rising from the ashen ejecta of this collision; it is merely 
one of the still-burning fragments. 
 
Conclusion 
 Todorov realized in his influential study of “fantastic” literature that “When we examine 
works of literature from the perspective of genre, we engage in a very particular enterprise: we 
discover a principle operative in a number of texts, rather than what is specific about each of 
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them.”16 I have attempted to do the same here. Indeed, I do not postulate the little weird to add 
yet one more genre-category to the already over-named movements of contemporary speculation. 
What I have attempted to present, as briefly as possible, is a new way of looking at already-
existent genres, names, and categories. Speculative fiction has long made of itself the narrative 
metaphor of Theory: social, scientific, philosophic—even literary. That it continues to do so 
now, particularly in the sociological and cognitive aspects I have here presented, only 
demonstrates its ongoing dynamism. Further, that its readership has for so long been such an 
actively discursive element of its construction means that it will continue to be read, to be 
conceptualized in the same manners in which it is written. The little weird is only one 
phenomenon of narrative-selves negotiating self-narratives, but, as the speculative tradition 
informing it has always done, it has begun a new conversation with itself that will ever inform 
the work that follows. 
 
Notes to Chapter 5 
 
1 Brian Attebery, “The Magazine Era: 1920-1960,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Science Fiction, eds., Edward James and Farah Mendlesohn (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), 
47. 
2 Maggie Ann Bowers explains in Magic(al) Realism that “The distinguishing feature of 
‘marvellous realism’, for instance, is that its fiction brings together the seemingly opposed 
perspectives of a pragmatic, practical and tangible approach to reality and an acceptance of 
magic and superstition into the context of the same novel.” Magic(al) Realism, The New Critical 
Idiom. Series ed., John Drakakis (London: Routledge, 2004), 3. Further the term realismo 
mágico applied to 1950s Latin American fiction refers to “to all narrative fiction that includes 
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magical happenings in a realist matter-of-fact  narrative, whereby, ‘the supernatural is not a 
simple or obvious matter, but it is an ordinary matter, and everyday occurrence—admitted, 
accepted, and integrated into the rationality and materiality or literary realism’ (Zamora and Faris 
1995: 3).” Ibid., 2 (italics original). 
3 Ibid., 4. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 Ibid., 84 
6 My comments here, are of course, generalized. Magical realism has a tendency to blur 
categorizing lines just as the little weird does. Bowers points out that “Zamora and Faris have 
noted both these aspects in their introduction to a collection of essays on magical realism, 
claiming that such critical analysis reveals that ‘Magical realist texts are subversive: their in-
betweenness, their all at onceness encourages resistance to monological political and cultural 
structures.” Ibid., 67. Further, in attempting to differentiate the little weird, I am not attempting 
an invective against magical realism; rather, I wish to map (as much as possible) their differing 
points of expressive departure. 
7 Ibid., 30. 
8 The common application of the category “science fiction” to speculative work does not 
occur without a reason, as the many historical essays in The Cambridge Companion to Science 
Fiction demonstrate. Science fiction itself grew some time ago from much older traditions (as 
did “fantasy”); however, the many sub-genres that now associate with speculative fiction are not 
as old. That they have yet to shed the categories of their forebears does not mean that they never 
will. Indeed, this practice of blanketing-terminology has already largely fallen into disuse among 
writers, readers, and editors of speculative fiction. 
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9 Ernest Keen, “Being Conscious is Being-in-the-World,” Self and Consciousness: 
Multiple Perspectives, eds., Kessel et al. (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc, 1992), 47. 
10 Robert Scholes, Structural Fabulation (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1975), 17. 
11 Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (New Haven, Yale UP: 1979), 78. 
12 See Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.’s “Marxist Theory and Science Fiction,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Science Fiction (see note 1), pp 119 and 118, respectively. 
13 Suvin, Metamorphoses, 24 (italics original). 
14 Csicsery-Ronay, “Marxist Theory,” 118 
15 Ibid., 119-120. 
16 Todorov, The Fantastic, 3. 
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